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Special Issue of the Journal of Rural Studies: The More-than- Economic 
Dimensions of Co-operation in Food Production 
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Abstract: This paper attempts to ‘put in their place’ (Sum and Jessop 2013) 
some key issues that frame the question of ‘the more-than-economic dimensions 
of co-operation’. In particular, it asks why capitalism deconstructs socio-natural 
reality into the ‘common-sense’ and discrete institutional spheres of ‘economy’, 
‘society’ and ‘environment’, an institutional constellation in which the ‘economy’ 
is usually afforded pre-eminence. Building on this, the paper further asks: why 
does the organization of society around the commodity form, and specifically 
around the generalization of the commodity form to labour-power that is the 
defining feature of capitalism, have the tendential effect of fragmenting, 
atomizing, and marginalizing social collectivities and cooperative behaviour? 
This question is answered through examination of the work of Polanyi and Marx, 
arguing that it is the latter who is best able to explain the nature and dynamics of 
capitalism, and its relationship to cooperative activity. The paper elaborates the 
Marxian approach and suggests strong linkages with the ‘radical’ fraction of the 
food sovereignty movement. The latter, like Marx, appears to invoke 
unconstrained cooperation as ‘actual’ autonomy; the paper asks what the 
political and ecological prerequisites for the realization of this social imaginary 
might be. 
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1. Introduction: Situating Cooperation, the ‘Economic’, and the ‘More-than-
Economic’ in Relation to Capitalism 
 
In this paper, we wish to suggest that, in attempting to address and secure 
cooperative behaviour in relation to the ‘extra-economic’ domain (that is, 
‘society’ and ‘environment’), it is essential to problematize the premise of the 
desirability of competitive behaviour in the ‘economy’ itself. This is so because 
much cooperative behaviour in farming ‘communities’ appears to be delimited 
by, and designed to mitigate the environmental and social disbenefits of, 
competitive, capitalistic rationality in the ‘economy’1. We will contend here that 
                                                        
1 Cooperation within agriculture typically assumes two forms: production cooperatives, where 
production resources and labour are used jointly, symptomatically a rarity in the capitalist global 
North; and service cooperatives, where services are provided to individual farming members, 
again symptomatically almost exclusively the meaning of cooperative in the global North. Service 
cooperatives take the form of supply cooperatives, supplying their members with inputs for 
agricultural production, and marketing cooperatives, undertaking transportation, packaging, 
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it is capitalism itself, specifically on its Marxian definition (see below), that 
erodes and delimits cooperative behaviour, engenders the contradictions that 
cooperative organization attempts to mitigate, and generates the separate, 
institutional/conceptual domains of ‘economy’, ‘society’ and ‘environment’ that 
comprise the problematic of this special issue.  
 
Anticipating our argument, we suggest that this is so because of capital’s singular 
focus upon accumulation through the valorization of human labour power. This 
has the effect of de-collectivizing and atomizing society, both in terms of the 
creation of a workforce now ‘free’ to sell its labour power to the capitalist at a 
competitive rate, and in terms of capitalist or petty commodity enterprises 
themselves in their compulsion to secure survival through necessarily 
competitive, rather than cooperative, behaviour (Perelman 2000, Teschke 2003, 
Lacher 2006)2. As we shall see, this arises from the conferral on capitalists, by 
the state, of absolute property rights in the means of production, a feature 
unique to capitalist social relations. The obverse of this condition is the 
alienability of assets, including land, via the medium of the market. This has the 
following, vitally important implication: since not only is the surplus alienable, as 
in all class societies, but also the means of production, a surplus expropriator (the 
capitalist) must compete with other appropriators in order to reproduce his/her 
social position, since he/she has no extra-economic right to his/her property. It 
is this condition for survival, founded on these historically specific social 
property relations, which creates the drive to maximize profit, to accumulate, to 
compete with other capitalists and petty commodity producers, and to keep 
social and environmental costs to a minimum (that is, to ‘externalize’ these 
costs). The competitive individualism that arises from these circumstances is not 
merely an ideology (see Emery 2015), therefore, it is a key component of the 
material reproduction of capitalist social relations. 
 
These social property relations have given rise to the historically specific 
appearance of society as existing ‘outside’ the economy or, indeed, as seeming to 
have no existence at all. This, at base, has generated the differentiated disciplines 
of ‘economics’ and ‘sociology’. At the same time, capitalism’s singular focus on 
accumulation through human labour valorization leads to the objectification of 
the environment as if it were a fungible commodity, entailing the conceptual 
                                                        
distribution, and marketing of farm products. Such service cooperative activity within the 
‘economy’ is, perhaps paradoxically, designed to enhance competitiveness or to insulate 
producers from the secular downward pressure on prices/incomes that competition induces. 
Cooperative activity in the ‘more-than-economic’ is designed typically to mitigate, but not to 
resolve, the social and ecological disbenefits flowing from the ‘economic’. A classic case of this 
within a fully neoliberalized context is National Landcare in Australia (see Tilzey 2006). 
2 We should note here that, in transitions to capitalism, small farms might lose their ability to 
reproduce themselves outside commodity relations and markets without necessarily being 
dispossessed of their land and other means of production. Indeed, this dynamic of the 
commodification of subsistence as Brenner (2001) terms it, may provide a more generic basis of 
the subsumption of labour by capital than the outright dispossession usually suggested by 
notions of ‘proletarianization’. In fact the vast majority of small and family farms fall into this 
category even when they have supposedly secured a level of ‘autonomy’ within ‘embedded 
markets’, rather giving the lie to van der Ploeg’s (2008) assertion that these constitute ‘new 
peasantries’. 
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reduction and material degradation of its multiple use values in the drive to 
maximize surplus value, in the guise of exchange value, through processes of 
capitalization, intensification and specialization (the ‘externalization’ of 
environmental ‘costs’). Within this institutional constellation, accumulation 
(economics) tendentially determines the subordinate place of, and contradictory 
relations with, the other domains of ‘society’ and ‘environment’3.  
 
These introductory remarks delineate some essential features of capitalism in 
relation to cooperative behaviour and the ‘ecological dominance’ (Jessop 2002) 
of the economy in relation to the ‘extra-economic’. These essential 
characteristics, while ‘real abstractions’, exist nonetheless within the ‘concrete’ 
realities of ‘variegated neoliberalism’ (see below) in which, empirically, there is a 
spectrum of differing cooperative behaviours and organizational structures. 
Recent work in this area, addressing cooperation, neoliberalism, and nature (see, 
for example, Stock et al. 2014), has sought to examine such varieties of 
cooperation along a spectrum from neoliberal autonomy (competitive 
individualism) at one extremity, to ‘actual’ autonomy at the other. The latter is 
defined, perhaps symptomatically, as collective freedom for farmers as a (sic) 
social class, such that individual freedoms are integrally connected to the 
ongoing reproduction of the (sic) farming sector, a definition deriving, as we 
shall see, from van der Ploeg (2008). Stock et al. (2014) examine four examples 
of cooperative organization along this spectrum: from New Zealand at one 
extreme (which we term hegemonic neoliberalism) to the Movimento do 
Trabalhadores Rurais sim Terra (MST) in Brazil at the other (which we term 
counter-hegemonic anti-capitalism).  
 
While this work, valuably, ‘creates an opening’ towards post-neoliberal alterity 
and more cooperative futures as ‘actual’ autonomy, as the example of MST 
implies, we suggest, however, that the attainment of this goal, together with 
explanation of the variegated cooperative forms presented, are somewhat 
constrained. This seems to be because of the authors’ reliance on a binary 
(autonomy versus ‘actual’ autonomy) that appears to derive, via van der Ploeg 
(2008), from Polanyi’s concept of the ‘double’ or ‘counter movement’ (Polanyi 
1957). As we explain below, we argue that Polanyi fails both to uncover fully the 
real logic propelling capital’s dynamic, and, in the concept of ‘double movement’, 
the complexities of political ‘accommodation’, ‘compromise’ and ‘resistance’ that 
accompany it. This is a failure that, we suggest, is reproduced in the work of van 
der Ploeg (2008, 2013) and other prominent theorists such as McMichael (2013). 
Indeed, the latter’s notion of the ‘corporate food regime’, and associated 
                                                        
3 Typically, the modern state, within which capitalism emerged and without which it could not 
survive, steps in to mitigate this ‘dis-integrated’ and contradictory relationship, selectively 
ameliorating the costs of social alienation and environmental degradation for both capital and 
wider ‘civil society’ but, in so doing, prolonging the ‘relational sustainability’ of this contradictory 
nexus (Drummond and Marsden 1999). Part of this mitigatory impulse, guided and/or funded by 
the state, involves ‘more-than-economic’ cooperative activities designed to bolster social or 
environmental ‘capital’. Symptomatically, however, the state eschews interference in the 
sacrosanct economic domain itself, the principal perpetrator of the contradictions, its 
involvement confined to ‘correcting’ so-called ‘market failure’ in the arena of ‘public goods’. 
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assertions concerning the full trans-nationalization of capitalism and the state 
under neoliberalism, have become virtually axiomatic amongst the considerable 
number of scholars (and activists), including McMichael himself, who have 
construed or constructed the concept of food sovereignty as a generalized 
counter-narrative to this putatively undifferentiated process of neoliberalization 
(see, for example, Claeys 2015, Fairbairn 2011, Wittman, Desmarais, Wiebe 
2011). Indeed, the justification for change towards food sovereignty, whatever 
that might entail, seems often to be couched in a relatively abstract, ‘rights’-
based master frame (see Claeys 2015 and below) that, while necessary up to a 
point, nonetheless evades the need for a more substantive analysis of the social 
relations that require subversion if ‘actual’ autonomy is to be realized (see Patel 
2011)4.  
 
If these authors, following Polanyi, van der Ploeg, and McMichael, have failed to 
uncover the essence of capitalism/neoliberalism, then the implication is that 
their definitions ‘post-neoliberal alterity’ and cooperative potentialities are likely 
to be similarly constrained. We argue that a more incisive and critical 
understanding of capitalism and the modern state – and their nemesis – needs to 
be founded centrally on a theory of social property relations, class, and 
exploitation – a theory that derives from Marx. Consequently, we will argue that 
there is a need to construct the notions of ‘actual’ autonomy, cooperative 
potentialities, and food sovereignty in Marxian, rather than Polanyian, terms.  
Here we suggest strong parallels between a Marxian approach and the ‘radical’ 
definition of food sovereignty (Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck 2011) where this 
implicates a direct challenge to market dependence through a reversal5 of the 
process primitive accumulation and subsistence commodification. 
 
With these opening comments in mind, the overall structure of the paper is 
based on the following logic of argument: 
We have, in this introductory section, delineated some of the key relationships 
between capitalist competition, cooperation, and the separation of institutional 
spheres into the ‘economic’ and the ‘more-than-economic’. We have also pointed 
to some of the variability in cooperative organization around this ‘ecological 
dominance’ of capital. There is contention, however, over what constitutes 
‘actual’ autonomy – whether this should be understood in Polanyian or Marxian 
terms. This then requires an examination of the respective merits of these two 
                                                        
4 Patel does not take the final plunge and advocate an explicitly Marxian approach, but he is there 
in all but name. ‘This base inequality in power is one that food sovereignty, sometimes explicitly, 
seeks to address. And it is here, in challenging deep inequalities in power, that I argue we see the 
core of food sovereignty. There is, at the heart of food sovereignty, a radical egalitarianism in the 
call for a multi-faceted series of ‘democratic attachments’. Claims around food sovereignty 
address the need for social change such that the capacity to shape food policy can be exercised at 
all appropriate levels. To make these rights substantive requires more than a sophisticated series 
of juridical sovereignties. To make the right to shape food policy meaningful is to require that 
everyone be able substantively to engage in those policies. But the prerequisites for this are a 
society in which equality-distorting effects of sexism, patriarchy, racism, and class power have 
been eradicated. Activities that instantiate this radical kind of ‘moral universalism’ are the 
necessary precursor to the ‘cosmopolitan federalism’ that the language of rights summons. And it 
is by these activities that we shall know food sovereignty.’ (Patel 2011, 194) 
5 Or, perhaps more accurately, a dialectical negation of this process. 
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thinkers in terms of their understanding of capitalism, its dynamics, and its 
relation to cooperation. This is undertaken in the next section, in which we 
assert the need for a Marxian-based definition of ‘actual’ autonomy as ‘strong’ 
cooperation. In the section following, we suggest that the Marxian position has 
strong affinities with the ‘radical’ fraction of the food sovereignty movement, 
whilst arguing that theorists of an undifferentiated ‘peasant way’, or 
‘progressives’, amongst whom van der Ploeg is an exemplar, deploy a more 
Polanyian than Marxian understanding of autonomy, eliding key areas of 
contention within agrarian classes and their relations with the state.  
 
Having made the case for a Marxian-based approach, we then elaborate this to 
examine further the relationship between ‘variegated cooperation’ and 
capitalism, with particular reference to the nature and emergence of the ‘radical’ 
positionality within food sovereignty. We do this because the radical 
positionality appears to be a prerequisite for the achievement of ‘strong’ 
cooperation as ‘actual’ autonomy. We then proceed to explore the reasons for the 
emergence, together with the dynamics, of the radical positionality in Latin 
America. We examine the case of Bolivia, where the ruling MAS party appears to 
be employing a Polanyian interpretation of socialism and cooperation to 
legitimate a particularly destructive form of capitalism denoted as ‘neo-
extractivism’. In the final section, we explore what a radical vision of ‘actual’ 
autonomy might entail, its relation to Marx’s observations on communism, and 
whether, by looking again at the Bolivian case study, it is possible to discern a 
coalescence of class forces propelling change towards a post-capitalist 
cooperative future. 
 
 
2. Polanyi and Marx 
 
In attempting both to understand and critique the reified ‘trichotomy’ of 
‘economy’, ‘society’ and ‘environment’, and the way in which cooperative activity 
is defined and constrained by it, we firstly wish to undertake a comparative 
assessment of the work of Karl Polanyi and Karl Marx. As the neoliberal 
contradictions of ‘economy’, ‘society’ and ‘environment’ have deepened 
appreciably since the turn of the millennium, and most evidently since the 
2007/8 financial and food crises, there has been a discernable increase in the 
attention directed to Polanyian concepts such ‘embeddedness’ and ‘double-
movement’ (Dale 2016). Indeed, within rural studies the demise of ‘political 
productivism’ (Tilzey 2000) has proven fertile ground for the growth of thinking 
around ‘endogenous development’, ‘re-localization’, ‘ecological citizenship’, and 
‘re-embedding’ of the economy. All these approaches have, as their common 
denominator, a desire to reconfigure the ‘market as means rather than master’ 
through instituting market relations in order to achieve favourable human 
development and more sustainable use of the environment.  
 
While Polanyi was influenced by Marx, and was likewise an advocate of 
socialism, he was nonetheless ambivalent concerning the conceptual status of 
class and, consequently, role of class struggle (Dale 2016). While Marx espoused 
historical materialism as a mode of analysis, Polanyi favoured Institutionalism 
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(Selwyn and Miyamura 2014). The two figures thus differed quite significantly in 
their respective conceptualizations of the way capitalism structures society and 
subverts its cooperative and collective institutions (ibid.). While the historical 
materialism of Marx is based in the concept of ‘mode of production’, in a theory 
of exploitation, and in a view of socialism – ‘actual’ autonomy? – as emerging 
from ‘workers’’ resistance to exploitation, Polanyi’s institutionalism represents 
an ideal-type conception of different economic systems, emphasizing 
commodification under capitalism and the ‘re-embedding’ the market through a 
rather unspecific process of socialization. 
 
Polanyi’s Institutionalism was intended to differentiate his position from 
neoclassical economists’ view of the ‘market’ as a self-regulating entity, the 
emergence of which was supposedly the product of spontaneous and natural 
evolution of trade and exchange (see Perelman 2000).  
We must rid ourselves of the ingrained notion that the economy is a field 
of experience of which human beings have necessarily always been 
conscious. To employ a metaphor, the facts of the economy were 
originally embedded in situations that were not in themselves of an 
economic nature, neither the ends nor the means being primarily 
material. The crystallization of the concept of economy was a matter of 
time and history. But neither time nor history has provided us with those 
conceptual tools required to penetrate the maze of social relationships in 
which the economy was embedded. This is the task of what we will here 
call institutional analysis. (Polanyi et al. 1971, 242) 
 
Polanyi’s Institutionalism was founded on a ‘substantivist’ (rather than 
‘formalist’ – neoclassical) view of the economy, described as an ‘instituted 
process of interaction between man and his environment, which results in a 
continuous supply of want satisfying material means’ (ibid., 248). In this, he 
described ‘locational movement’ as the production and transportation of goods 
and services and ‘appropriative movement’ as the distribution and ownership of 
those goods and services, deploying both to underscore what he saw as the 
transcending importance of the institutional aspect of the economy. Polanyi’s 
rationale here was to demonstrate that not all forms of human society are 
definable according to market relations and ‘the logic of rational action’ (ibid., 
234). 
  
This Institutional approach, drawing on Weberian ideal types, has the 
unfortunate consequence, however, of emphasizing the mere description and 
cataloguing of the appearances of societal exchange and distribution (of goods 
and services), rather than uncovering the causal mechanisms involved in 
generating the historical forms of society and their dynamics. This leads, perhaps 
ironically given Polanyi’s terminology, to a rather formalistic, rather than 
substantive, treatment of social organization and change, in which these are 
accounted for merely by different combinations or relative ‘weightings’ of 
essences (ideal types) as ‘forms of integration’. 
 
In this way, when we assess Polanyi’s explanation for the nature of capitalism as 
a socio-economic system, for the transformation of labour power into the 
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commodity form, for its class-bound and in-egalitarian character, and for the 
consequent constraints on cooperative behaviour (where dysfunctional for 
capital accumulation), we encounter significant deficiencies in his work (Dale 
2016). Thus, for Polanyi, the ‘market’, like ‘reciprocity’ and ‘redistribution’, is 
simply another ‘form of integration’ or ‘instituted process’ that describes how 
resources are exchanged and circulated in society. His objective is to depict the 
institutions that govern how goods are circulated and distributed, rather than to 
explain the social relations between producers and non-producers. 
Consequently, Polanyi conceives of the market as a mere technical mechanism 
for moving goods and services from one individual to another. In this way, his 
conception of the market is founded rather more on a neoclassical conception of 
supply and demand than on a Marxian notion of ‘social relations of production’ 
(or of ‘domination’, as we prefer) and on the social property relations which 
underpin how surplus is produced, controlled, and distributed within a 
particular ‘mode of production’ (‘domination’).  
 
Polanyi, in rejecting, in the manner of neoclassical economics, the Marxian labour 
theory of value, thereby refused to conceptualize the market as a social relation 
comprising an exploitative dialectic between capital and labour. This 
essentialized (formalized!), de-historicized, and de-socialized conception of the 
market has important implications for his analysis of capitalism and his vision 
for socialism. This, in turn, has obvious consequences for how we understand the 
‘economic’, the ‘more-than-economic’, the nature of, and relations between, 
cooperative behaviour in these domains, and the notion of ‘actual’ autonomy.  
 
By contrast, Marx’s mode of production concept is designed to specify the ways 
in which the dominant propertied classes secure conditions for the extraction of 
surplus from the immediate producers. As noted, such extraction can, under 
capitalism, include the so-called ‘commodification of subsistence’, whereby small 
farms may lose their ability to reproduce themselves outside commodity 
relations but without necessarily being dispossessed of their means of 
production. Thus, the form of exploitation, by which Marx refers to the 
appropriation of the unpaid part of the product of the labour of others, is central 
to his understanding of socio-economic (re)production and historical 
transformation. 
The specific economic form in which unpaid surplus-labour is pumped 
out of direct producers determines the relationship of rulers to ruled, as it 
grows directly out of production itself and, in turn, reacts upon it as a 
determining element. Upon this, however, is founded the entire formation 
of the economic community which grows out of the production relations 
themselves, thereby simultaneously its specific political form. (Marx 
1972, 927)6  
                                                        
6 We should note that the means by which surplus labour is ‘pumped out’ of producers is both 
material and ideational. Because, under capitalism, this process happens ‘within production’ and 
through the mechanism of the ‘dull compulsion of the economic’ due to the separation of workers 
from direct access to the means of production, it appears as if the mechanism of extraction is 
wholly ‘material’ or ‘economic’ – hence Marx’s preoccupation with the commodity form and the 
‘economy’ as the secret of surplus extraction within capitalism. But to suggest that this 
represents an ‘economism’ is misplaced because Marx recognized that the dynamics of the 
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Selwyn and Miyamura (2014) point to a number of distinct, but inter-connected 
and mutually constitutive, moments of exploitation that underpin Marx’s 
understanding of capitalism. These include: 
 Within the sphere of production (including through subsistence 
commodification) where value is generated by workers and extracted by 
capital; 
 Within the sphere of exchange (labour market) where worker’s labour 
power is institutionally organized so that it can be sold to capital for its 
subsequent exploitation in the workplace and where worker’s wages 
constitute ‘effective demand’ for capital’s products; 
 Within the private sphere (the family) where (mainly) women’s unpaid 
labour contributes to the generational reproduction of the labour force. 
Here capital attempts to maximize the externalization of costs of 
reproduction onto the ‘private sphere’, whilst maintaining the fiction that 
labour is just a commodity wholly reproducible within the capital relation 
– the ‘private sphere’ is thus treated by capital in the same way as ‘nature’ 
(see below); 
 In relations with ‘nature’ where nature is an intrinsic part of the capital 
relation (as ‘source’ and ‘sink’ for everything that capital produces and 
consumes), but is not fully accounted for because capital ‘pays’ only for 
that element of nature transformed through human labour7.  
 
In analyzing capitalism from the perspective of exploitation, Marx emphasized its 
essential class-bound character with the intention of illuminating how the 
exploited (including ‘voiceless’ nature) could ultimately overthrow the 
exploiters. Polanyi’s objection to capitalism and the commodity ‘fiction’8 was 
based partly on his moral condemnation of laissez-faire liberalism. Not only was 
market society historically unprecedented because it required the 
transformation of labour, nature, and money into commodities, it also 
                                                        
system, in the final analysis, are determined by class struggle, an ideational issue, albeit a 
struggle enacted within the structuring conditions of the capital-labour relation. It is because of 
this that we prefer the term mode of domination, or exploitation, to mode of production. 
 
7 In its drive to accumulate surplus value, through maximization of production and minimization 
of costs (the maximization of surplus value embodied in unpaid human labour), capital generates 
intensification, specialization, and simplification of production, thereby degrading or destroying 
nature’s multiple use values where these are not related directly to the production of 
commodities (and even where they are if this means that the commodities in question can be 
produced at maximum output without any regard for the future – a ‘discounting’ of the future). In 
this way, capital fails to ‘internalize’ the majority of nature’s ‘costs’ in a manner that might secure 
the reproduction of those use values. And yet capital, hubristically, treats nature as a fungible 
commodity (‘natural capital’) as if capital were capable of substituting for the multiple and 
irreplaceable use values that it destroys or degrades. Nature is, therefore, in most respects a 
fictitious commodity because capital is incapable of reproducing nature’s use values or replacing 
those destroyed.  
 
8 Polanyi defined ‘commodities’ as entities produced specifically for sale in the marketplace. 
Entities that did not fall into this category, but which capitalism treated as if they were 
commodities, he termed ‘fictitious commodities’. 
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threatened the basis of society – the fundamental need of people to be sustained 
by family, community, and other social relations. In response, Polanyi suggested 
that society engages in a ‘counter-movement’ to restrict the extent of 
commodification. While Polanyi did recognize the fact that society is constituted 
by different social classes, he conceived the ‘counter-movement’, however, as 
motivated by a supra-class and general societal interest (Dale 2016). He 
contended that the mobilization of narrow class interests would not generate 
their intended outcomes, the latter requiring a higher level of supra-class 
cooperation and collaboration. As Burawoy (2003: 229) has pointed out, Polanyi 
is in this regard rather naïve in his failure to recognize the proclivity of the 
capitalist state to take the part of the dominant social classes in repression or 
cooptation of non-capitalist classes (the ‘classes of labour’ (Bernstein 2010)). 
This naivety is founded at least in part on Polanyi’s antipathy towards Marx’s 
arguments concerning the inherently exploitative nature of capitalism and the 
consequent centrality of class struggle in its contradictory reproduction.  
 
Polanyi’s rejection of Marx’s labour theory of value enables him to construct an 
image of society as an organic whole, one that, in its attempts to protect itself 
from the market, can politically overcome any systematic form of exploitation. 
He understood exploitation not only as resulting from unequal exchange 
(underpayment of commodified goods and services – a non-Marxian 
interpretation) but perhaps more importantly as arising from society’s inability 
to sufficiently regulate or modify the effect of the ‘market’ under capitalism. In 
this way, exploitation could, for Polanyi, be eliminated by re-embedding the 
market within non-market institutions. 
 
As Burawoy (2003) remarks, Polanyi has a strangely weak understanding of 
society itself, despite his counterposition of ‘society’ against the ‘market’. As we 
have seen, there is no notion of the ‘economy’ itself as a social relation between 
classes generating a confictual dynamic, and no notion of an internal, but 
differentiated relation between ‘society’ and the ‘economy’. Polanyi’s uncritical 
acceptance of the orthodox, de-socialized conception of the market reveals his 
inability to understand how, under capitalism, ‘social’ (political) and ‘economic’ 
processes are institutionally discrete but functionally integrated and co-
constitutive. Their institutional separation conceals an essential unity, based on 
the specifically capitalist social relations that underpin commodified labour 
power – its ability to sell at its full price in the market while simultaneously 
generating surplus value in production (Selwyn and Miyamura 2014).  
 
By conceptually, separating the two spheres and assuming that the ‘economy’ 
has its own distinct laws, Polanyi was able to present ‘society’ as potentially in 
opposition to the ‘economy’ under capitalism (Dale 2016). However, it is 
precisely this split between the exploitation of labour (in production) founded on 
the conferral of absolute property rights and the commodification of labour 
power, on the one hand, and the removal of ‘extra-economic’ authority (the 
‘political’) to a separate institutional sphere, on the other, that generates under 
capitalism the dichotomy between ‘civil society’ and the ‘state’. This constitutes 
what is historically unique about the form of exploitation within this mode of 
domination  - the (apparent) lack of ‘extra-economic’ coercion as a means to 
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extract surplus from producers (Wood 1995). Furthermore, the status of labour 
power as a commodity is not dependent merely on the expropriation of the 
direct producers from the means of production, it also requires the ongoing 
political economic and social subordination of labour to capital (including the 
‘commodification of subsistence’). This requires the generation of varying forms 
of ‘market dependence’, as a generality requiring that the sellers of commodified 
labour power incapable of reproducing the means of livelihood outside the 
capital-labour relation, but also including wider mechanisms such as 
indebtedness to capital, or subordination to monetized levies imposed by the 
state-capital nexus. 
  
The state-capital nexus, first in Britain and subsequently in Western Europe and 
North America, was concerned, therefore, not only to institute a market society 
founded on the reproduction of fictitious commodities to underpin an 
expansionary industrial revolution. It also aimed, systematically, to maintain the 
mass of the population in a condition of poverty and political weakness in order 
to maximize its economic exploitation (Selwyn and Miyamura 2014). This 
relation between the state-capital nexus and the mass of the population was only 
ever partially overcome via means of imperialism, whereby exploitation, poverty 
and political weakness could be ‘externalized’ onto a global Southern periphery 
(Wong and Sit 2015), while workers’ resistance at home, in what became the 
global North, could be neutralized via consumerism and nationalistic ideologies – 
the creation of a ‘labour aristocracy’ (Tilzey 2016). 
 
The commodification of labour and its exploitation under capitalism were, and 
are, two sides of the same process. Economic exploitation and the extraction of 
surplus value from labour by capital was simultaneously an ‘economic’ process 
(in the realms of the private, capitalist workplace) and a ‘political’ process, 
supported and instituted by pro-capitalist states as they sought to raise the 
competitiveness of their economies in relation to other capitalist economies 
(Wood 2002; Selwyn and Miyamura 2014). This explains both the separation 
and internal relationship between the ‘economic’ and the ‘political’ under 
capitalism, and the necessarily nationalistic and territorialized shape of 
capitalism as the state-capital nexus.  
 
Given Polanyi’s failure to identify the exploitation of labour (and nature) that 
Marx saw as the quintessential substance of commodification, it is unsurprising 
that Polanyi had a very imprecise idea of what ‘de-commodification’, socialism, 
and by extension cooperation, might entail. His ambiguous conception of labour 
under ‘embedded’ markets makes it unclear whether he advocated an end to the 
capital-labour relation, as implied by Marx’s vision of socialism, or whether he 
invoked its mere regulation by supposedly ‘non-market’ actors such as the state. 
The latter explanation appears more consistent with his overall understanding of 
commodification and, if this is so, then his conception of ‘de-commodification’ is 
actually quite limited. In other words, the Keynesian compromise between 
capital and labour embodied what Polanyi, on this interpretation, considered to 
be the de-commodification of labour.  
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Lacher (2007) refers, however, to the Keynesian compromise as a ‘slight’, rather 
than a ‘great’, ‘transformation’. Modernizing capitalist states used this ‘slight 
transformation’ of capital-labour relations to enhance their legitimacy and to 
spread and deepen capitalist social relations through consumerism, ‘articulated’ 
development, and nation-building. While capital has sought to unravel aspects of 
this relation under neoliberalism, precisely because labour had waxed too 
contumacious under the previous regime, key elements of the relation 
nonetheless remain in the form of consumerism and nationalism. The privileges 
of the global Northern ‘labour aristocracy’ are sustained, however, only by 
renewed relations of imperialism (Smith 2016) with the global South. Beguiled 
by the rewards of consumerism and liberal citizenship, this ‘labour aristocracy’ 
has thereby forsaken its role as agent in socialist transformation.  
 
Polanyi, therefore, has a rather vague definition of socialism because he lacks an 
overarching theory of capitalism and of potential transitions beyond capitalism. 
This stands in contrast to Marx’s clear identification of the ‘classes of labour’ 
(including class fractions of the peasantry) as agents of socialist transformation 
grounded in their struggles against, and potentially beyond, capitalist 
exploitation. While consistent with his analysis, Marx may not have anticipated, 
however, that such struggles would, for the reasons outlined above and detailed 
below, attain their most cogent form in the peripheries, rather than the core, of 
the capitalist system9.  
 
We conclude this discussion of Polanyi and Marx by distilling out some of its key 
implications for the theorization of cooperative activity and the relationship 
between the ‘economic’ and the ‘more-than-economic’ spheres. We have sought 
to show that the very definition of, and separation between, the trichotomy of 
‘economy’, ‘society’, and ‘environment’ arises from capitalist social relations as 
understood by Marx rather than by Polanyi. In this way, we suggest that 
engendering sustainability in the ‘extra-economic’ sphere through cooperative 
activity and organization cannot be undertaken comprehensively unless social 
relations in the ‘economy’ are themselves transformed away from capitalistic 
competition. ‘Extra-economic’ aspirations towards greater cooperation will thus 
continue to be constrained by the ‘ecological dominance’ of capitalistic relations 
in the ‘economy’. So it does not appear simply to be a question of the re-
prioritization of the ‘more-than-economic’ vis-à-vis the ‘economic’ as if the two 
could un-problematically continue to run alongside one another. Rather, the very 
definition and substance of what we mean by ‘economy’ needs to be 
reconstituted so that it no longer possesses an ‘external’, or alienated, relation to 
the ‘extra-economic’.  
 
Marx achieves this through his social relational and class-based understanding of 
capitalism. Polanyi, however, does not because he fails to de-construct accepted 
and reified categories. The ‘economy’ for him thus retains its neoclassical 
                                                        
9 Nonetheless, there is growing evidence that, in his later writings, Marx was looking increasingly 
to the ‘periphery’ both as the potential source of ‘counter-hegemonic’ resistances and as the 
potential foundation of post-capitalistic ‘commons’, thereby giving the lie to any simplistic and 
‘stagist’ notion, as in ‘orthodox’ Marxism, that society had necessarily to pass through ‘developed’ 
capitalism before socialism could be attained (see Anderson 2016). 
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meaning and so retains an external relation to the ‘more-than-economic’. For 
Polanyi, the ‘Great Transformation’ or  ‘socialism’ entails the mere restraining, or 
embedding, of the ‘economy’ by ‘society’, not its reconstitution and 
transformation through changed social relations between capital and labour. In 
other words, we need, following Marx, to de-reify and de-essentialize the 
signifiers ‘economic’ and ‘extra-economic’ together with cognate, neoclassically 
derived terminology such as ‘social capital’ and ‘natural capital’. It is, therefore, 
not merely the ‘cultural normalization of a narrowly economic and 
individualistic interpretation of independence (that is, neoliberal autonomy) 
…that has worked to undermine producers’ capacity to work together…with 
others over the long-term’ (Wynne-Jones et al. 2015, 2) but, rather, the very 
nature of capitalist social relations as alienating competition.  
 
It is this necessarily competitive character of the capitalist ‘economy’, as 
explained in the Introduction, that, via its ‘ecological dominance’ over the ‘extra-
economic’ domains, fatally compromises the possibility of thoroughgoing 
cooperative organization in the latter. Consequently, the assertion here is that 
any ‘long-term success of cooperation’ in the ‘more-than-economic’ domain 
(entailing the ‘emergence of shared values, the casting off of individualized and 
self-interested motives, the formation of close trusting relationships, and 
working towards common goals’ (ibid.)) will always be tightly constrained so 
long as the ‘economy’ retains ecological dominance and is defined competitively 
on the basis of exploitative social relations. 
 
In this, therefore, Polanyi has a fundamentally different conception of the 
makeup of society and its constituent parts than Marx. Polanyi employs a 
Weberian categorization of the essential elements of society that are always the 
same but merely have differing ‘weightings’ in different societies. Here there is 
no notion of a dialectical relation between, or mutual definition of, societal 
spheres. It is possible in Polanyi’s view of society, therefore, to ‘embed’ some 
elements, the ‘extra-economic’, for example, in cooperative behaviour whilst 
somehow allowing the ‘economy’ to continue as subject to the ‘laws’ of supply 
and demand. Polanyi also has a fundamentally different notion from Marx of 
what might constitute cooperative behaviour and organization. This comprises, 
as above, the mere emplacement of social restraints, the ideological sloughing off 
of individualism, or the assertion of some degree of autonomy, rather than social 
relational transformation.  
 
Finally, and flowing from this, Polanyi has a fundamentally different notion from 
the Marxian one of societal change and the ends to which this should be directed. 
The latter, again, proposes social relational transformation towards 
unconstrained or ‘strong’ cooperative relations through a sundering of the 
capital-labour dialectic and, with this, the termination of ‘external’ relations 
between the ‘economic’ and the ‘more-than-economic’. 
 
 
3. Polanyi and the ‘Progressives’; Marx and the ‘Radicals’ 
 
 13 
Polanyi’s critique of commodification is founded, therefore, on the fact that it 
allows ‘fictitious commodities’, particularly people and land, to become subject 
to the ‘law’ of supply and demand. However, in uncritically accepting this ‘law’, 
rather than class relations, as the basis of the ‘self-regulating’ economy, Polanyi 
inadvertently adopts a neoclassical understanding of the ‘economy’. As a 
consequence, he has no theory of exploitation that underlies commodification, no 
theory of capital accumulation, and therefore no adequate theory of the social 
and ecological consequences of capitalist expansion. The result, as intimated 
above, is a simplistic binary between an undifferentiated ‘social interest’, on the 
one hand, and the unregulated play of the ‘law’ of supply and demand, on the 
other. This has clear parallels today in populist assertions of a generalized 
interest of ‘civil society’ versus ‘corporate capital’, strong residues of which 
appear in the work of McMichael (2013) in his notion of the ‘corporate food 
regime’, and in that of van der Ploeg (2013) in his undifferentiated, Chayanovian 
view of the ‘peasantry’ as unitarily counterposed to ‘Empire’10. As a result, it is 
certainly difficult, in the Polanyian frame, to have any clear notion of what 
cooperative activity in food production, as ‘socialism’ or ‘actual’ autonomy, might 
look like. On Polanyi’s own criteria, it could well conform either to the ‘political 
productivism’ of the European Fordist era, or to the ‘embedded neoliberalism’ 
(Tilzey 2006, Tilzey and Potter 2008) of the current post-Fordist conjuncture, or 
indeed to both.   
 
Unlike Polanyi, Chayanov (1966) and van der Ploeg do at least accept the 
Marxian definition of capitalism as an exploitative class relation between capital 
and wage labour (see van der Ploeg 2013, 124). Unfortunately, they delimit this 
class relation very rigidly and literally to those forms of production involving 
capital and the employment of wage labour, thereby excluding from capitalist 
relations the ‘commodification of subsistence’ (Bernstein 2010), a phenomenon 
that affects virtually all farms below the ‘upper peasantry’ – that is, all farms that 
do not employ wage labour. All farms that do not employ labour are, thereby, 
assumed by van der Ploeg to be non-capitalist and/or somehow immune to the 
compulsions of the competitive market. Such farms are then assumed to possess 
a common interest as ‘peasants’ and to operate according to the various 
Chayanovian principles of ‘balance’ (van der Ploeg 2013, 23). By failing to grasp 
the significance of the ‘commodification of subsistence’, a whole new entity – the 
‘new peasantries’ – is thereby created, supposedly ‘autonomous’ from the 
pressures of capitalist competition and accumulation.   
 
One consequence is that, for van der Ploeg, the supposedly ‘post-productivist’ or 
‘multifunctional’ elements of ‘embedded neoliberalism’11 appear eminently 
compatible with his conception of ‘actual’ autonomy, even to the extent that 
‘these new markets can be considered to be commons’ (2013, 130), a bold claim 
indeed. There appear to be a number of significant problems with this notion of 
                                                        
10 Van der Ploeg derives the term ‘Empire’ from Hardt and Negri (2000) who make the claim that 
capital under neoliberalism is fully de-territorialized and trans-nationalized and is now 
counterposed, consequently, to a generalized and undifferentiated counter-movement 
comprising the ‘multitude’ (Hardt and Negri 2004). 
11 These elements receive financial support through agri-environmental and rural development 
measures within the EU Common Agricultural Policy, for example. 
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‘actual’ autonomy, particularly where seen as equating to the ‘post-productivist’ 
or ‘multifunctional’ turn. 
 
First, as noted, van der Ploeg posits a narrow definition of capitalism that 
excludes the ‘commodification of subsistence’ as a key feature of capitalist 
relations in agriculture, in which ‘peasants’ are commonly workers for capital 
and in which petty commodity producers are frequently constrained to compete 
in a capitalist market, irrespective of whether this market is defined by 
economies of scale (productivism) or by those of scope (post-productivism). 
Second, this narrow definition of capitalism permits the categorization of the 
resulting ‘peasant’ forms of production, together with the commodities thereby 
produced, as non-capitalistic. The further consequence is the construal of the 
‘post-productivist’ and ‘multifunctional’ turn in Europe as non-capitalistic and as 
opposed to entrepreneurialism. Third, since all farms which do not employ wage 
labour are defined as ‘peasant’, there is a lack of appreciation of class 
differentiation, or differential class identification, within this broad 
categorization and, therefore, of the frequent relations of exploitation and 
competition, as much as of cooperation, that exist between and within the 
categories of small/family farm, upper, middle, and lower peasantries. Here we 
may point, for example, to the process of ‘accumulation from below’ (Li 2014) 
whereby upper peasants commonly appropriate, through the reproduction 
squeeze, the land and labour of the middle and lower peasantry. Indeed, 
‘cooperation’ may well involve activities that entail exploitation simply because, 
for Chayanov and van der Ploeg, everything that peasants do is, by definition, 
non-capitalistic. 
 
Fourth, there is s radical underestimation of the degree to which these ‘peasants’ 
of all classes are subject to the need to produce commodities at a competitive 
rate (whether within economies of scale or of scope) and/or to the need to sell 
labour power in order to meet the imperatives of economic reproduction. At the 
same time, consequently, there is a radical over-estimation of the degree of 
autonomy available to ‘peasants’ to pursue the Chayanovian ‘balances’ that 
supposedly structure their actions. Van der Ploeg (2013, 32) suggests that, in 
respect of Italian minifundi ‘the desire to maintain the patrimony (and keep the 
property in the family) is a basic drive that explains the presence and continuity 
of farms, the existence of which cannot possibly be solely explained by reference 
to markets’. There may well be, and frequently is, a strong desire to retain land in 
the face of market non-viability, but the unavoidable fact remains that these 
farms and farm families, where they require to variously service debts, 
mortgages, make a profit, or simply maintain a certain level of consumerism, are 
obliged to engage in the capitalist market to enable farm survival. Unless they 
can do so with some measure of success, the farm will have either to be sold or 
‘de-activated’. Consequently, pluriactivity, often involving off-farm work, is a 
frequent strategy to generate sufficient family income to sustain the farm. This 
hardly suggests a high degree of autonomy from capitalist social relations. 
Additionally, far from continuing to produce ‘autonomously’, he admits, almost 
as an aside, that many of these farms are now partly de-activated precisely 
‘because of low prices for farm products’ (ibid.). 
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Fifth, there appears to be an inadequate grasp of the relationship between the 
state, capital and the agriculture sector and the way in which agrarian social 
property relations have been manipulated by the state-capital nexus ‘all the way 
down’, since the dawn of the modern state, to variously facilitate capital 
accumulation, enforce private property rights, secure through productivism the 
supply of cheap wage foods for the urban proletariat, bolster the legitimacy of 
the state through the creation of a middle farm ‘yeomanry’, and secure 
extirpation and/or de-radicalization of the peasantry. The creation of a 
politically compliant class of family farms has been an important ingredient in 
the engineering of the ‘farmer road’ to capitalism and nation-building 
characteristic of the imperial powers of the global North and their ‘settler states’. 
Many of these farmers, despite state-capital dependency, exhibit a strong ethos 
of independence and autonomy, but to suggest that they are anti-capitalist or 
anti-entrepreneurial is surely very far from the truth.  
 
Sixth, the absence of the notion of class differentiation and inequality, together 
with the way in which van der Ploeg defines the ‘peasantry’, has the necessary 
effect of perpetuating market dependence through the denial of the phenomenon 
of the commodification of subsistence. In other words, the way in which the 
‘peasantry’ and ‘actual’ autonomy are defined fatally undermines the possibility 
of addressing class relations, exploitation, and inequality, not only within the 
rural, but also throughout the wider society. 
 
Finally, there is a failure to appreciate the degree to which the ‘post-productivist’ 
turn has been embroiled in neoliberal conceptual definitions, and material 
constructions, of environmentalism and ‘sustainable consumption’, and the 
degree to which this turn has been enabled by imperialistic relations with the 
global South. It is no accident that the ‘post-productivist’ turn coincided with 
deepened (albeit ‘embedded’) neoliberalism in the global North and the 
extension of ‘informal’ (economic) imperialism to the global South. And it is no 
accident that the fragmentation of informal empire with the food and financial 
crises of 2007/8 has ushered in a renewed focus on (neo-)productivism and the 
relative demotion of ‘post-productivism’ in the global North (see Tilzey 2016)12.  
                                                        
12 As Tilzey and Potter (2008, 47-8) have noted: ‘It is within this [neoliberal] context that a 
putatively oppositional paradigm of post-productivism (more specifically that of endogenous or 
agrarian-based rural development) has been promoted, premised on the assertion that the 
market power of corporate food interests can be countered by exploiting the turn by consumers 
away from industrial food provisioning in favour of quality food production (Marsden 2003; 
Marsden and Sonnino 2005; Morgan et al. 2006). While these authors place emphasis on 
elements – localism, ecological sustainability – that are key to strong sustainability, their 
paradigm remains centrally wedded to market dependency (see Wood 2002, 2005) and 
therefore subject to the contradictions that attend this condition. Thus, the turn to economies of 
scope and niche markets, and therefore dependency by smaller producers on middle-class 
consumption as their principal revenue stream, is likely to afford only temporary respite from 
the pressures of competition as more producers enter the field of quality production. Downward 
pressure on prices and capital concentration are predictable outcomes, while the volatility and 
arguably unsustainable nature of upper income consumption – premised as this increasingly is 
on global, neoliberal circuits of finance capital – would suggest considerable caution in relation to 
the longer-term viability of this ‘alternative’ paradigm. Indeed, these authors (Morgan et al. 2006, 
195) have themselves expressed reservations concerning the assumed ‘alterity’ of their 
paradigm, intimating that the turn to the ‘local’, when allied to continuing market dependency, 
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The consequence is that neither Polanyi nor van der Ploeg provides us with a full 
explanation of capitalist dynamics and its relation to the modern state (with 
respect particularly to the agrarian dimension in the case of van der Ploeg). The 
result is that both present visions of ‘alterity’, and of potential modes of 
cooperative organization and behaviour, that lack trenchancy and are in 
important respects actually conformable with capitalism. In this, their analytics 
and normative imaginaries appear to share much in common with the class 
positionality of what Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck (2011) have termed the 
‘progressives’. This positionality is invoked typically by small farm petty 
commodity producers and domestic agri-business, located principally in the 
global North, whose primary livelihood concern is the erosion of ‘their’ local 
markets by more globalized circuits of ‘corporate’ agri-food capital. This concern 
is to be addressed principally by ‘re-embedding’ such markets through the 
mechanisms of localization and ecologization, thereby re-equilibrating the 
principles of ‘balance’ that putatively characterize small farmer and ‘peasant’ 
rationality. The model of cooperative organization envisaged here appears to 
have much in common with the Swiss example of Prolait examined by Stock et al. 
(2014). 
 
As described by Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck, the ‘radical’ positionality, by 
contrast, appears to be inspired by a more Marxian stance in its invocation of a 
class-based, and deeper, social relational, transformation towards social equality 
and universal access to the means of production via re-assertion of the 
‘commons’. This entails an abrogation of absolute property rights in, and the 
alienability of, land, as upheld by the state-capital nexus, such that the market no 
longer acts as mediator between people and their access to the means of 
production. In this view, cooperative and collective endeavours become liberated 
from the shackles of capitalistic competition (Herrera and Lau 2015, Wong and 
Sit 2015). When allied to a political ecological praxis, this positionality invokes 
food sovereignty in its foundational (global Southern) definition (Edelman 
2014), with access to land – land sovereignty – a pre-eminent demand, entailing 
a reversal of the process primitive accumulation and subsistence 
commodification. This, more Marxian-inspired, invocation of food sovereignty is 
expressed by global Southern scholars particularly, including Amin (2015), Katz 
(2016), Moyo (2015), Patnaik (2015), Wong and Sit (2015), and others. Given 
the dynamics of land and resource scarcity under capitalism, a political 
ecological praxis also suggests the need for a programme of de-growth solidarity 
(see Exner et al. 2013) and a strategy of dual powers in order to dissolve current 
social relations of domination. Of the examples of ‘variegated cooperation’ 
presented by Stock et al. (2014), the radical positionality appears to have most in 
common with that of the MST in Brazil. 
                                                        
may merely represent the ‘inside’ of a wider process of rescaling the state, the ‘outside’ being the 
growth of supra-national scales of governance associated with neoliberal globalization 
[imperialism]. This reprises our earlier discussion of denationalization and destatization as key 
elements of neoliberalization, suggesting that while endogeneity and the ‘alternative food 
networks’ paradigm do contain oppositional (anti-systemic) elements, their discourse of market 
dependency assures tendential conformity to a systemic (neoliberal) form of post-productivism.’ 
 
 17 
 
Further, this positionality implies a profound problematization of the 
institutional separation of the ‘economy’ and ‘polity’ in society that marks the co-
constitution of capitalism and the modern state. Equality and ecological 
sustainability are the twin principles underlying this ‘radical’ alterity, thereby 
challenging both class relations within and between states, notably imperialism, 
and also capital’s expansionary and ecologically dysfunctional dynamic. This 
positionality is invoked typically by the middle and lower peasantries 
(commonly semi-proletarians), the landless, proletarians, and indigenous people, 
located overwhelmingly in the global South. As the impacts of neoliberal 
austerity deepen and the ranks of the ‘labour aristocracy’ dwindle, this 
positionality is also likely, however, to gain increasing purchase in the global 
North, and particularly on its periphery (southern and eastern Europe, for 
example).  
 
 
4. Elaborating the Marxian Approach 
 
In this section, we elaborate a Marxian understanding of the origins of capitalism 
and the modern state, the accompanying dissolution of cooperative relations in 
production and distribution of use values, the perpetuation of capitalism through 
the state-capital nexus as variegated capitalism, and the differentiated 
resistances to neoliberalism by sub-, alter-, and counter-hegemonic social forces. 
We do this in order better to understand what it is about capitalism that 
subverts untrammeled, or ‘strong’, cooperative social relations, how this 
subversion is sustained through constrained forms of cooperation, and which 
social forces of resistance are most likely, in turn, to subvert capitalism through 
assertions of ‘actual’ autonomy. 
 
Marxian political economy, together with its understanding of society’s 
metabolism with nature (political ecology), proposes that the contradictions of 
capitalism arise from a disembedding of production and reproduction from 
socio-ecological relations. Disembedding constitutes the subordination of a prior 
and/or exterior moral economy to the alienated relations of the capitalist 
market, abstracted from socio-communal control and from local ecological 
affordances, checks and balances13. Alienated market relations, as market 
dependence (Wood 2002, 2009), are predicated on the formal or real 
expropriation of producers from their means of production, enforcing the sale of 
labour power to capital14. Marx (1972) termed this ‘primitive accumulation’, a 
process originating in the spatially and historically-specific social property 
relations of late-medieval England (Brenner 1985, Dimmock 2014), crystallized 
in the enclosure movement of 17th, 18th, and 19th century Britain, and 
subsequently extended globally through colonization and imperialism.  
 
In this process, the peasantry and indigenous peoples were expropriated, fully or 
partially, from their direct and customary access to the means of livelihood and 
                                                        
13 Thus far, Marx and Polanyi would have been in agreement. 
14 At this point, however, Marx and Polanyi would have parted company.  
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subsistence, a process that not only continues today, but is also accelerating in 
the global South, particularly. This ongoing process of dispossession and (semi)-
proletarianisation forces producers to become ‘free’ wage labour in order to 
survive15. This process is a fundamental element underpinning the genesis and 
reproduction of capitalist social relations. It is unsurprising, therefore, that it has 
been associated historically with profound contestations surrounding access to 
land (and water and other resources) as the basis of the means of production. 
Today, as the ‘new imperialism’ (Smith 2016) continues the process of enclosure, 
primarily in the global South, dispossession and (semi)-proletarianization are 
reflected in diverse and on-going struggles over the conditions of livelihood. 
Resistances to, and claims to reverse, primitive accumulation may therefore be 
termed, in their most comprehensive aspect, ‘livelihood sovereignty’. 
 
One of the major social casualties of primitive accumulation and enclosure of 
commons was (and continues to be) the loss of cooperative behaviour in the 
production and distribution of food and other essential resources16. The benefits 
of such pre-enclosure cooperative activity were more constrained than they 
might have been, of course, by the need to yield up, to the lord of the manor and 
to the church, a ‘surplus’ either of labour or of produce. Post-enclosure, with 
many expropriated commoners now labouring for the new agrarian capitalists or 
removed to the industrial towns and cities, cooperation became subordinated to 
the principle of competition. Enclosure was the central premise underpinning 
the emergence of capitalism as a mode of domination defined by the 
generalization of the commodity form to labour-power (Brenner 1985; Teschke 
2003), entailing a fundamental break with previous modes.  
 
This emergence involved the simultaneous formation of a new institutional 
sphere designated the ‘economy’, constituted as such by the modern state, but 
given freedom to function or fail within a ‘depoliticized’ arena of generalized 
competition. Lords of the manor now let their lands to the highest bidder, the 
new tenancies only secure, however, if they could ‘improve’ the land and yield a 
favourable rate of profit. Failure to do so would result in eviction and 
                                                        
15  Semi-prolerarianisation means that part of the labourer’s subsistence needs is still derived 
from food production for home consumption, but this is insufficient, due to lack of land, to supply 
in full the subsistence needs of the family, generating the need to sell labour. 
16 Joan Thirsk describes vividly this process in the case of the English enclosures: ‘Common fields 
and pastures kept alive a vigorous cooperative spirit in the community; enclosures starved it. In 
the champion country people had to work together amicably, to agree upon crop rotations, stints 
of common pasture, the upkeep and improvements of their grazings and meadows, the clearing 
of the ditches, the fencing of the fields. They toiled side by side in the fields, and they walked 
together from field to village, from farm to heath, morning, afternoon, and evening. They all 
depended on common resources for their fuel, for bedding, and fodder for their stock, and by 
pooling so many of the necessities of livelihood they were disciplined from early youth to submit 
to the rules and customs of the community. After enclosure, when every man could fence his own 
piece of territory and warn his neighbours off, the discipline of sharing things fairly with one’s 
neighbours was relaxed, and every household became an island unto itself. This was the great 
revolution in men’s lives, greater than all the economic changes following enclosure. Yet few 
people living in this world bequeathed to us by the enclosing and improving farmer are capable 
of gauging the full significance of a way of life that is now lost.’ (Thirsk 1967, quoted in Perelman 
2000, 13) 
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replacement by a more ‘competitive’ tenant. This rate of profit depended, in turn, 
upon the efficiency of the newly commoditized labour power of former 
commoners. This generalization of the commodity form to labour-power, the 
fundamental premise underlying the formation of the average social wage that 
underpins capital accumulation, necessarily entailed the deconstruction of the 
communal and collective use of, and access to, the means of production. Such 
deconstruction was necessary both to separate labour from its means of 
production and, subsequently, to pit the resulting de-collectivized individuals 
against one another to lower the social cost of labour for capital to secure 
accumulation through competition. There is, thus, a general impulse within 
capitalism to atomize collectivities and communal activity where these are 
dysfunctional with respect to the competitive formation of a socially average 
wage. 
 
Capital’s genesis thus depended upon, and was co-constituted with, the 
formation of the modern state. Capital’s subsequent survival has also depended 
upon its co-evolution with a protective state within which classes and class 
fractions contend in relation to the degree to which contradictions should be 
mitigated, via ‘flanking’ measures, in order to ensure the ‘relational 
sustainability’ of capitalism (Drummond and Marsden 1999). This process may 
be grasped from a combination of the Political Marxian, Neo-Gramscian, and 
Regulation Theoretical traditions (Wood 1995, Potter and Tilzey 2005, Tilzey 
and Potter 2008). In the parlance of the latter, modes of regulation may, 
depending crucially upon the nature of the regime of accumulation, introduce 
various types of measures, ‘formal’ or ‘informal’, that seek to mitigate the 
negative social and environmental impacts of accumulation through, for 
example, notions of ‘social capital’, ‘natural capital’, greater cooperation between 
enterprises, but crucially without subverting capitalist relations of domination 
that continue to secure the ‘ecological dominance’ of capital (see Jessop 2002). 
Thus while a Marxian approach would view these measures as the outcome of 
class contestation within the state-capital nexus and as constituting various 
forms of ‘embedded’ capitalism, the Polanyian approach would view them, 
mistakenly, as the outcome of a generalized ‘double-movement’, representing 
various forms of ‘alterity’ as socialism. 
 
This Marxian conceptualization of capital and its relation to the modern state 
contrasts with van der Ploeg’s and McMichael’s reproduction of the Polanyian 
‘double-movement’ as a relatively simple binary comprising ‘empire’ or 
‘corporate food regime’, on the one hand, and ‘resistance’ (from the ‘outside’), on 
the other. This binary neglects the ‘flanking’ measures that the state-capital 
nexus is compelled to construct and which embody compromise and co-optation 
between, in the current conjuncture, neoliberal tendencies and sub-hegemonic 
and oppositional trends. In other words, it elides both the differences within 
capital (intra-class contestation) and the differences in opposition to it, for 
example, between alter-hegemonic and counter-hegemonic movements, or 
between ‘progressives’ and ‘radicals’ (Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck 2011). This 
has important implications, because not only does it blunt our analysis of the 
complexity of capital’s dynamics, it also, normatively, and through conflation in 
the significant degrees of resistance to ‘capital’, subverts our capacity to specify 
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definitions of, and pathways to, non-capitalistic, cooperative futures, including 
those based on food and land sovereignty. 
 
The co-optation of ‘market constraining’ interests through modes of regulation, 
means that capital’s successive iterations are the outcome of contextually 
specific forms of resistance engendered through this process of intra- and inter-
class contestation, primarily at the level of the state. Within the current 
conjuncture, a singular world-scale application of the Polanyian double-
movement scheme represents an undifferentiated depiction of neoliberalization 
processes associated with ‘empire’ or the ‘corporate food regime’ and the 
resistances to it. The concept of variegated capitalism, within and between states, 
can, however, advance our understanding of neoliberalization, its crisis 
tendencies and the nature of opposition, and the possibility of its transcendence 
(Brenner et al. 2014). In this way, the Polanyian double-movement, as 
opposition, is already instantiated within variegated neoliberalism as modes of 
regulation, wherein there is no simple binary between neoliberalism and its 
opposite, but rather various gradations from hegemonic, through sub-
hegemonic, to counter-hegemonic class positions. Awareness of these gradations 
sensitizes us to what is ‘post-capitalist’ and what is not, rather than subsuming 
all beneath the assumed alterity of generic ‘resistance’ in the manner of Polanyi, 
McMichael, and van der Ploeg. This suggests the need for a Marxian analytics, 
based on class and relations of exploitation and domination, and structured 
around the state-capital nexus such as is afforded by Political Marxism and neo-
Gramscian theory, rather than a Polanyian approach. 
 
Such an analytics of the dynamics of variegated capitalism, and the intra- and 
inter-class antagonisms and alliances that inform these dynamics, are well 
illustrated in the work of Tilzey and Potter (2006, 2007, 2008) with respect to 
country case studies in the global North. Indeed, the theoretical framework 
presented in Tilzey (2006) and Tilzey and Potter (2008), although developed in 
order to understand variation in modes of agri-environmental governance, 
appears well suited nonetheless to an analysis of the forms of ‘variegated 
cooperation’ presented in the work of Stock et al. (2014)17. The forms that these 
authors discuss extend, we suggest, from strongly neoliberal at one end 
(cooperation designed to enhance competitive capacity - what we might term 
‘accommodation’ to neoliberalism), through ‘hybrid’ or ‘embedded’ forms 
(cooperation designed to ‘insulate’ farmers from extra-regional competition 
                                                        
17 As intimated in the Introduction, we believe their analysis is, for a number of reasons, not as 
strong as it might be. One reason is that it appears to rely quite heavily on ideological 
determinations, perhaps under-emphasizing the equal importance of social property relations of 
capitalism, their class foundations and relation to the state, in the determination of the varieties 
of neoliberalism and cooperation discussed, together with their degrees of alterity. Further, the 
reliance on van der Ploeg (2008) to define ‘actual’ autonomy seems problematical because, in 
Polanyian fashion, he tends to subsume ‘progressive’ and ‘radical’ positionalities within an 
assumed and generalized anti-capitalist ‘counter-movement’. In other words, he conflates the 
‘compromisers’ (alter-hegemonic) and ‘resisters’ (counter-hegemonic) under the general rubric 
of the ‘new peasantries’. The reliance of Stock et al. (2014) on van der Ploeg and his binary is 
therefore unfortunate because this theoretical frame seems not to do full justice to the 
differentiation in cooperative behaviours and structures that their analysis presents.   
 
 21 
through the construction of local markets based on economies of scope – what 
we might term ‘compromise’ with neoliberalism), to more or less anti-neoliberal 
at the other (cooperation designed to prioritize the production of use values over 
profit – what we might term ‘resistance’ to neoliberalism). Embodying, broadly 
speaking, hegemonic, sub-hegemonic, alter-hegemonic, and counter-hegemonic 
positionalities, this spectrum seems to reflect the relative importance of 
particular agrarian classes and class fractions in relation to politico-economic 
complexion of the state (Tilzey and Potter 2008).  
 
Stock et al. (2014) discuss four forms of ‘variegated cooperation’: in New 
Zealand, where Fonterra Dairy represents a monopoly cooperative to facilitate 
competition in global markets in the complete absence of state support (what we 
might term hegemonic neoliberalism); in England, where landscape-scale agri-
environmental and PES initiatives, craving supra-farm cooperative organization, 
are constrained both by individualized payment structures and by the atomized 
petty commodity rationalities of farmers (what we might term a sub-hegemonic 
reformism, where state support modifies, through ‘flanking measures’,  the full 
impacts of capitalist commodity production); in Switzerland, where a 
territorializing service cooperative (Prolait) attempts to construct a 
local/regional market through economies of scope whereby to insulate farmer 
members from wider, extra-territorial competition (what we might term an 
‘alter-hegemonic’ or ‘progressive’ positionality, where the emphasis is on 
survival of medium and small farmers through reduction of dependence on 
external inputs, and the localization and ecologization of markets); and in Brazil, 
where the MST comes closest to ‘actual’ autonomy by mobilizing, in anti-
capitalist fashion, cooperative and collective production towards the satisfaction 
of social and environmental needs, not profit (what we might term a ‘counter-
hegemonic’ or ‘radical’ positionality where capitalist market dependence is itself 
challenged). 
 
Accordingly, it is possible to suggest that this variegation, extending from 
accommodation associated with neoliberal autonomy, at one end of the 
spectrum (the case of New Zealand), to something approaching ‘actual’ 
autonomy as resistance, at the other (the MST in Brazil), may be attributed to the  
…balance of class interests in the state and by the latter’s status within 
the ‘world system’ – whether core/dominant or 
peripheral/subordinate…State level, systemic responses to post-
productivism [read ‘cooperation’] …exhibit variability in the degree to 
which they are willing to intervene in the market to secure sustainability 
objectives within a context given by the ascendancy of processes of 
neoliberalization…Variability in neoliberalization appears to flow…from 
the way in which it is subject to articulation with, and compromise by, other 
class and related interests within each state-society complex. (Tilzey and 
Potter 2008, 42-44, emphasis added) 
 
In other words, as the outcome of ‘territorially-bounded constellation of 
state/class interests, alliances and compromises’ (Tilzey 2006, 4) we have, in the 
examples presented by Stock et al. (2014) a spectrum, from New Zealand to 
Brazil, of progressively more market restraining forms of cooperation. In this, 
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they parallel Tilzey’s (2006) categorization of modes of agri-environmental 
governance from radical neoliberalism (accommodating - New Zealand), through 
‘embedded’ neoliberalism (mitigating - England), and social democratic or social 
income support (compromising – Switzerland), to ‘strong’ multifunctionality 
(resisting – Brazil).  
 
In a similar vein, but with a global focus, Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck (2011) 
break down the double-movement binary through a quadripartite structure 
denoted as ‘neoliberal’, ‘reformist’, ‘progressive’ and ‘radical’. These nuanced 
gradations in intra-class and inter-class positions enable these authors to lay out 
the complexities of contestation and compromise in the dynamics of agri-food 
regimes, allowing them not only to explain such dynamics, but also to detail the 
definitional content of ‘resistance’, not as one, but rather as several, contested, 
class positions. This enables these authors to paint a realistic picture of the 
potential fusions and fissions that, flowing from these class positions, are likely 
to attend food movement mobilizations. Thus, Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck’s 
‘progressives’ may often be members of La Via Campesina (LVC, the global 
movement of small farmers and peasants), but their aim is, as we have seen, not 
so much the transcendence of capitalism as the re-localization and ecologization 
of markets in conformity to the alternative food networks paradigm (Goodman 
et al. 2012). For the ‘radicals’ of LVC, by contrast, it is the critique of market 
dependence that, defined by the re-unification of producers with the means of 
production and an imaginary of ‘strong’ cooperation, constitutes the essence of 
their class position.  
 
If this imaginary of ‘strong’ cooperation as ‘actual’ autonomy can be equated 
most to the radical fraction of the food sovereignty movement, a fraction located 
differentially in the global South, how then is this positionality to be accounted 
for spatially, and what are the prospects for its consolidation and diffusion? In 
order to answer these questions, it is necessary to have some understanding of 
the relationship between classes, class co-optation and the state-capital nexus, 
and of the dialectic between the territorialized form of the state-capital nexus 
and the global capitalist system. 
 
To date, it would seem that capitalism has been remarkably successful in 
neutralizing and co-opting, through hegemony, resistance to its exploitative 
dynamic. This success, however, has been located differentially in the global 
North. An essential part of this ability to neutralize and co-opt resistance lies in 
the fact that the capitalist world system is characterized by a broadly bi-polar 
structure: the socially ‘articulated’ states of the global North, and the 
‘disarticulated’ states of the global South.18 The oppositional relations between 
capitalist and non-capitalist classes in ‘articulated’ states have been defused, 
tendentially, by ‘flanking’ measures based on (re)-distributional, nation-building, 
                                                        
18 Social disarticulation occurs when the state-capital nexus is interested in its labour force 
principally from the perspective of production (its ability to generate surplus value) and not 
primarily from the perspective of consumption (the realization of surplus value through the sale 
of commodities). Social articulation implies a complementarity between the role of the labour 
force as producers and consumers, or a situation in which their role as consumers outweighs 
their significance as producers.  
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environmental and other policies, together with the bestowal of citizenship 
rights that have mitigated the conferral on capitalists of absolute property rights 
in the means of production19. This explains the predominance of ‘embedded’ 
(mitigating) and social democratic (compromising) forms of cooperation in the 
global North (radical neoliberal forms tend to located in the ‘semi-periphery’, 
such as New Zealand and Australia, where, under neoliberalism, the family farm 
structure of settler states has been divested of public subvention). 
 
Under neoliberalism, attempts to sustain this compact in the global North have 
been undertaken increasingly by means of imperial relations, both ‘informal’ 
(economic) and ‘formal’ (politico-military), with the global South. Surplus value 
from the classes of labour now flows from South to North, ‘subsidized’ by the 
massive and destructive haemorrhage of ‘ecological surplus’ that lies behind this 
relationship (Exner et al. 2013; Moore 2015).  Burgeoning levels of social and 
ecological dislocation in the South have been the consequence of this extractive 
relationship, arising from the combined, although differentiated, operation of 
these ‘political’ and ‘biophysical’ dynamics of the state-capital nexus (see Tilzey 
2016). Neoliberalism has similarly subverted the incipient processes of nation-
building in the South that had characterized the Keynesian ‘developmentalist’ 
era. Neoliberal re-assertions of absolute private property through primitive 
accumulation, with the state acting as an organ of the expropriators and agro-
exporting fractions of capital, have served to undermine the legitimacy functions 
of the capital-state nexus throughout much of the global South. The outcome of 
this ‘new imperial’ relationship (Harvey 2003) between North and South is that 
citizens of the former are accorded certain privileges (public services, social 
welfare/protection, higher consumption) denied to those in the capitalist 
periphery (see, for example, Mooers 2014).  
 
This lack of legitimacy and effective ‘flanking’ measures for capital in the global 
South carries with it, however, the increased likelihood of challenge to the state-
capital nexus by counter-hegemonic forces of a ‘radical’ complexion. The 
implication is one of an increased, immanent possibility of attempted re-
appropriations of the state by counter-hegemonic social forces in re-assertions 
of national, and possibly post-national, forms of sovereignty.  Such ‘radical’ 
counter-hegemonic social forces potentially challenge the essential foundations 
of capitalism, propounding a more Marxian imaginary of ‘actual’ autonomy and 
cooperative social relations. This has occurred in partial and varying degrees in 
Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela in Latin America, and in Nepal in Asia, for 
example (Moyo and Yeros 2011). Nonetheless, these global Southern re-
assertions of sovereignty in its national form are not without ambiguity – there is 
no singular ‘other’ counterposed to neoliberalism. Rather, these re-assertions of 
national sovereignty comprise a complex mélange of sub-hegemonic (national 
capital fractions) and counter-hegemonic (lower/middle peasantry, landless, 
proletarians, and indigenous) social forces. The assertion of national sovereignty 
here, as a counter-narrative to neoliberalism, represents a tension between 
                                                        
19 Agri-environmental and ‘post-productivist’ policies in the global North represent examples of 
such flanking measures that have served to co-opt and neutralize ‘small farmer’ resistance to 
neoliberalization, simultaneously dulling more radical, and potentially post-capitalist, 
imaginaries of ‘actual’ autonomy (Tilzey 2006, Tilzey and Potter 2007). 
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populist ‘neo-developmentalism’, on the one hand, and ‘post-developmentalism’ 
(combining environmentalism, indigenism, re-peasantization, agroecology, food 
sovereignty, founded on a cooperative and communal imaginary), on the other. 
 
This Marxian-based analysis suggests that global capitalism and its state form are much less 
monolithic, and more fractured, than Polanyi, van der Ploeg, or McMichael, through their 
binary of the ‘corporate empire’ versus ‘society’, would lead us to believe.  The suggestion here 
is that these fracture lines are at their widest in the global South because, as a periphery for the 
core, it is here that the contradictions of accumulation are greatest and the legitimacy of the 
state is lowest. Consequently, it is in the South that the potential for transformations towards 
‘radical’ cooperative futures is greatest. 
 
In the next section, we explore the dynamics of accumulation and resistance, with particular 
reference to Latin America (Bolivia), in order to understand the political and ecological 
conditions in which a ‘radical’, Marxian-based imaginary of ‘actual’ autonomy, invoking land 
and food sovereignty (livelihood sovereignty?), might be germinated. In the final section, we 
explore what this radical imaginary of ‘actual’ autonomy might entail in terms of new social 
and ecological relations of production as  ‘strong’ cooperation. 
 
 
5. Capitalism, the State, and Resistances in Latin America 
 
We now examine how relations between the state-capital nexus and its 
resistances in Latin America, the latter often structured around a discourse of 
cooperative and communal living as buen vivir, may be understood through the 
theoretical perspective developed in this paper. Neoliberalism, as ‘informal’ 
empire, although still hegemonic in the North, and dominant in the South, is 
increasingly crisis prone and subject, therefore, to a variety of resistances (Tilzey 
2016). Some of these are reformist or sub-hegemonic, reflecting the interest of 
states, in conjunction with more nationally focused fractions of capital, in re-
asserting national sovereignty, whilst others are more radical, or counter-
hegemonic, and seek a post-developmental path in which food/land sovereignty, 
agroecology, and imaginaries of cooperative and communal ways of living, are of 
central importance. We are therefore passing through a crucial period, socio-
politically and ecologically, in which a number alternative politico-ecological 
imaginaries, some systemic and others anti-systemic, are being defined and 
contested.  
 
These trends are well demonstrated in Latin America, where there has been 
widespread resistance to the socially polarising consequences of neoliberalism 
and to the progressive loss of national sovereignty (including sovereignty over 
food) that has accompanied the deepening of ‘extroverted’ dependent 
development, a reflection of the hegemony of neoliberal, trans-nationalized 
fractions of capital. Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela all represent 
examples of states where popular forces, comprising peasants, semi-
proletarians, proletarians and landless, indigenous groups (in Bolivia and 
Ecuador particularly), and more endogenously oriented class fractions of the 
bourgeoisies, have attempted, with varying degrees of success, to resist and 
displace the dominance of the ‘disarticulated alliance’ of trans-nationalized 
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capital.  What these countries have in common is a new commitment to greater 
state guidance and interventionism in the economy, a greater formal or 
substantive commitment to national food sovereignty, and the introduction of 
social programmes to alleviate the severe income disparities characteristic of the 
neoliberal era.  
 
The above named states have engaged in processes of ‘passive revolution’ 
(reform from above, led by nationally-oriented fractions of capital, but in alliance 
with proletarians, peasants and indigenous people) that has been characterized 
as neo-developmentalism, or neo-extractivism (Veltmeyer and Petras 2014, 
Spronck and Webber 2016). Despite some countries (Venezuela in particular) 
seeking to address the causes of semi-proletarianisation, landlessness and 
precarismo through structural measures such as land reform, all these states, 
nevertheless, continue to pursue policies of both energy and mineral extraction 
(often on ‘protected’ lands of indigenous peoples), and of productivist, export 
agriculture, in order to fund social programmes and infrastructure development. 
In Ecuador, Bolivia and Brazil, despite the election of left-leaning regimes, little 
progress has been made with respect to land reform in favour of the semi-
proletariat and landless (Giunta 2014; Spronck and Webber 2016). This is 
largely due to continuing opposition from an entrenched landed oligarchy and 
their governments’ apparent willingness to overlook this in the pursuit of export 
earnings through extractivism. A percentage of revenues from primary resource 
extraction has been diverted to social programmes to placate the urban 
proletariat, leading to an uneasy compromise, embodied in these populist 
regimes as ‘compensatory states’ (Gudynas 2012), between subaltern classes 
and the continuing power of the landed oligarchy. 
 
As a result, increasing tensions have become apparent between these neo-
developmentalist regimes and their erstwhile constituencies of support among 
the indigenous groups and semi-proletarian and landless peasantry, often 
members of LVC. For these constituencies, tensions focus around access to land 
and the means of production, and around the neo-developmentalist focus on 
economic growth as a means of bypassing the need to address the structural 
causes of land poverty and landlessness. In this way food (and land) sovereignty 
has become a highly contested discourse, deriving initially from re-assertions of 
national sovereignty as a counter-narrative to neoliberalism, but now often 
appropriated by neo-developmentalism. This discursive tension and ambiguity is 
expressed in the constitutionalization of food sovereignty in Ecuador and Bolivia, 
for example. The appropriation of food sovereignty discourse by the 
governments of those countries, in the service of neo-developmentalist ends, is 
increasingly contested by peasant and indigenous movements seeking a post-
developmentalist model of cooperative social relations founded on the principle 
of buen vivir (good living) (Giunta 2014; Tilzey 2015, 2016). The irony here is 
that the governments of Ecuador and Bolivia have both invoked the cooperative 
principle of buen vivir to legitimate further capital accumulation by means of a 
Polanyian process of ‘embedding’ extractivism through the ‘compensatory state’. 
 
Consequently, these agrarian and indigenous constituencies of support are 
becoming increasingly alienated from centre-left regimes such as those in 
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Bolivia, Brazil and Ecuador. Moreover, the current decline in primary commodity 
prices, hitherto supported by Chinese capital accumulation, will see a reduction 
in government budgets for social programmes and a renewed focus on austerity, 
with a resultant melting away of urban working class support for these regimes. 
Such contradictions are reviving divisions on the political left and intensifying 
debates amongst peasant and indigenous constituencies, particularly, concerning 
the respective strategic merits of ‘autonomist’ or ‘dual powers’20 approaches to 
securing socially equitable, cooperative, and ecologically sustainable futures 
(Mooers 2014; Geddes 2015).  
 
 
6. Class Differentiation amongst the ‘Peasantry’: Contested Constructions of 
Buen Vivir as an Imaginary for Cooperative Futures in Bolivia 
 
In this section, we examine the accuracy of van der Ploeg’s and McMichael’s, 
Polanyian-inspired, assertions concerning subordination of class positionality 
amongst the ‘peasantry’ to the political purpose of unity of all ‘people of the land’ 
against their principal enemy, corporate agribusiness. As Bernstein notes (2016), 
peasant populism has always denied the dynamics of class differentiation among 
small farmers, a legacy of the most important theorist of the ‘peasant economy’, 
Chayanov, and that while differences among farmers may be acknowledged by 
champions of the ‘peasant way’, such acknowledgement remains gestural. Such 
displacement of the analytical by the political (ie the normative), he also 
suggests, impoverishes the means by which to understand some key drivers and 
directions of agrarian change and class formation today, as it does historically. 
Again, the central relevance of this debate to the question of ‘actual’ autonomy 
and cooperative social relations lies in the capacity of the Polanyian derived 
approach to mistake ‘embeddedness’ and ‘embedded’ capitalism for anti-
capitalism21. 
                                                        
20 Autonomist approaches advocate grassroots struggle ‘outside’ bourgeois forms of the state and 
a withdrawal to local ‘autonomous’ zones of resistance (e.g. Zapatistas in Mexico, MST in Brazil); 
dual powers approaches consider it premature to call for a dispersion of power before power has 
been secured – the strategy here is to radically transform the state in order then to disperse 
power downwards.  
21 It is, of course, true that ‘objective’ class position and ‘subjective’ class positionality may not 
coincide. This is truer still given the increasingly all-pervasive (‘economic’, ‘socio-cultural’, and 
‘ecological’) contradictions of capitalism, the impacts of which seem to transcend class and find 
expression in the ‘new social movements’ (Foweraker 1995). This means that there is now 
greater potential for ‘unification’ of disparate classes under a common banner given that the 
‘enemy’ – ‘corporate capital’ – is now apparently so all encompassing. This is evidently the case 
with the ‘peasant way’ and ‘food sovereignty’ on its now widened definition (see next section). 
This widened definition represents the ‘master frame’ (see Rice 2012, Claeys 2015) to which all 
adherents of the ‘peasant way’ can subscribe. While such a ‘master frame’ may be an important 
and valid basis for social movement coherence and mobilization up to a certain point, the more 
so when the ‘enemy’ appears to be so pervasive, it nonetheless elides crucial differences in class 
position amongst and between followers of the ‘peasant way’. These differences are likely to 
come to the surface, however, as social movement strategy moves forward from an oppositional 
stance towards the proactive formulation of more detailed policy proposals. The elision of class 
difference, whilst understandable and perhaps strategically necessary up to a point, nonetheless 
has the effect of perpetuating a ‘master frame’ as simplistic binary, both overemphasizing the 
monolithic character of the ‘opposition’ and evacuating the immanent bases of dissention 
amongst ‘allies’. To adopt an uncritical stance in relation to this binary of the ‘peasant way’ 
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We now examine the contention that there is an undifferentiated peasantry, and 
a unified ‘peasant’ positionality, by looking (briefly) at rural class structure in 
Bolivia. We do this because Bolivia encapsulates all of the key issues discussed 
above, food sovereignty has been enshrined in its constitution, and the ruling 
MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo) party explicitly invokes pro-‘peasant’ and 
indigenous positionalities in its anti-imperialist rhetoric, including the assertion 
that its policies embody the cooperative principle of vivir bien. 
 
Rural class structure in Bolivia is characterized by a concentration of land in the 
hands of a few, and large numbers of often landless peasants. Haciendas occupy 
ninety per cent of Bolivia’s productive land, leaving only ten per cent divided 
between mostly indigenous peasant communities and smallholding peasants. 
Four hundred individuals own seventy per cent of productive land, while there 
are two and a half million landless peasants in a country of nine million people 
(seventy-seven per cent of peasants are indigenous) (Enzinna 2007; Webber 
2016).  
 
Of the 446,000 peasant production units remaining in the country today, 
225,000 are located in the altiplano, 164,000 in the valley departments (yungas), 
and only 57,000 in the eastern lowlands. Capitalist relations of production now 
predominate in the eastern lowlands and are increasingly displacing small-scale 
peasant production in the valleys and altiplano, although the latter continues to 
be the most important form of production in the altiplano (Ormachea Saavedra 
2007). (The altiplano accounts for only nineteen per cent of total cultivated 
land.)  The rural population is diminishing throughout the country as processes 
of semi-proletarianization and proletarianization accelerate with the gradual 
expansion of capitalist relations of production to all parts of the country (ibid.). 
From the early 1970s, migrant semi-proletarians provided the workforce for 
sugarcane and cotton harvests in the lowlands, while, for the rest of the year, 
they maintained small plots of land in the highland departments from which they 
primarily travelled (that is, Cochabamba, Potosi, and Chuquisaca). Between 1976 
and 1996, rural population as a percentage of total population fell from fifty-nine 
to thirty-nine percent (Pacheco Balanza and Ormacheo Saavedra 2000). This 
decline was caused by two main factors: declining production in the altiplano 
due to soil exhaustion and increasing division of land into minifundios over time 
due to population expansion; and increased capitalization of agriculture in the 
lowlands, leading to decreased employment opportunities (ibid.). This squeeze 
has accentuated the differentiation of the peasantry into rich, medium, and poor 
strata. 1988 survey data suggest that seventy-six percent of peasantry were poor 
peasants (lacking means to reproduce their family labour-power on their own 
land and obliged to sell labour elsewhere on a temporary basis). Medium 
peasants constituted eleven percent of the peasantry (defined as family units 
able to reproduce labour without selling labour-power elsewhere). Rich 
peasants (making a profit after reproducing their family and means of 
                                                        
versus ‘corporate capital’ (the ‘double-movement’) is invoke a Polanyian narrative, effectively 
denying, as Polanyi did, the essence of capitalism as an exploitative class relation.  
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production, and purchasing the labour of poorer peasants and using modern 
technology) comprised thirteen percent (Ormachea Saavedra 2007). This 
process of peasant differentiation has only accelerated since then (the middle 
being squeezed), with richer peasants becoming commercial farmers (ibid.). 
 
This process has continued under the government of Evo Morales and his MAS 
party, despite its pro-peasant and indigenous rhetoric.  Capitalist social relations 
in agriculture have continued to expand under this regime, from seventy-nine 
percent of farm production to eighty-two percent. In 2005-6 small peasant 
production accounted for twenty-five percent of total agricultural production in 
the altiplano. By 2008-9, however, this figure had fallen to under twenty-two 
percent. State subsidies and support are directed to capitalist, agro-industrial 
production in the lowlands while small-scale peasant producers in the highlands 
are effectively abandoned (Ormachea Saavedra 2011).  
 
A Marxian, rather than a Polanyian/Chayanovian or populist conceptualization 
(such as taken by the ruling MAS party in Bolivia), suggests that certain groups of 
the peasantry – that is, the upper peasant stratum – are actually benefitting from 
these processes of differentiation at the expense of other groups – that is, the 
great majority in the form of semi-proletarians and the rapidly diminishing 
cohort of middle peasants. This process of class stratification is mystified, 
however, by pro-government, populist discourse in its treatment of the 
peasantry as a homogeneous social class (Webber 2016). The reality is that a 
significant, and growing, stratum of the peasantry are coming to be defined as 
‘rich’ as per the tripartite classification above. They are accruing profits as a 
direct result of surplus appropriation through the work of salaried labourers – 
that is, of semi-proletarians from the growing stratum of poor peasants in most 
instances. They also have growing motivations for expanding accumulation 
through expropriation of further land, either from the middle or lower strata of 
peasantry, or from indigenous tribal groups in the lowlands through a process of 
primitive accumulation (Ormachea Saavedra 2011). 
 
The result is that it is very difficult to speak of a ‘peasant way’ in general as one 
encompassing the class interests of all three strata of peasantry. Rather, the 
upper peasantry is likely to espouse a type of Polanyian ‘alterity’ more akin to 
that of small capitalists and petty commodity producers of the global North (the 
‘progressives’), their primary opponents being the agro-industrial landed 
oligarchy with whom they are in competition for land and labour. Absent threats 
from this quarter, the rich peasantry is relatively happy with the status quo 
under MAS, from whom the latter draws its core support (and the class from 
which Morales himself comes). By contrast, it is the middle and semi-proletarian 
peasantry who, for the reasons identified above, are most likely to advocate 
‘radical’ change away from the status quo and towards land and food sovereignty 
– a change involving, at its heart, fundamental land reform in favour of these 
lower peasant strata. This is a Marxian road to alterity through social relational 
change to ‘real citizenship’ (see final section) through human emancipation by 
means of the re-unification of producers with their means of production. The 
land involved in such reform will need to be taken not only from the landed 
oligarchy but also from the upper stratum of peasantry. The objective of such 
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land reform is likely to be the creation of a stable stratum of middle peasantry, 
able to support its own reproduction and to produce modest surpluses from 
which to supply the non-farming population.  
 
A transformation in this direction will be important, indeed vital, for both social 
and ecological reasons. The current conjuncture is highly unstable and 
unsustainable for both reasons – for the social reasons identified above, and for 
the ecological reasons deriving from the nature-destroying and fossil-fuel based 
character of the agro-industrial agriculture being practiced in the eastern 
lowlands. The classes benefitting from this process, the landed oligarchy, 
extractive industries, and the upper peasantry, are placing in jeopardy the 
livelihoods of the majority of Bolivians – the middle and lower peasantry (semi-
proletarians), the urban proletariat, and lowland indigenous groups. To date, the 
urban proletariat has been placated by the ‘compensatory state’ (Gudynas 2012) 
through the proceeds of ecologically and socially destructive extractivism – but 
this cannot continue and is, indeed, faltering, as the commodity boom 
decelerates and austerity again begins to bite. The class interests of the middle 
and lower peasantries coincide in this conjuncture with those of proletarians – 
indeed many ‘proletarians’ are semi-proletarians. If the sustainable utilization 
and stewardship of Bolivia’s rich ecosystems, including agro-ecosystems, are to 
be assured through food and land sovereignty for the long-term benefit of all as 
‘real citizens’, then an alliance of these subaltern social forces – the middle/lower 
peasantry, the urban proletariat, and lowland indigenous groups – would seem 
to be an imperative development. 
 
In the present, but increasingly unstable, conjuncture, buen vivir has been 
deployed as the foundational ‘myth’ for MAS’ populist programme, taken as a 
projection of the collective, cooperative Andean and indigenous way. The reality 
described above, one of extractive capital and the peripheral, compensatory 
state, is very different from this assumed cooperative ideal. Using this 
cooperative ideal to legitimate its standing amongst the subaltern classes, MAS 
has attempted, via the compensatory state, to embed capitalism in Polanyian 
fashion by mitigating, in some measure, the impacts of extractivism on the 
subaltern classes. 
 
 
7. Counter-hegemony and the Promise of Cooperative Futures   
 
Counter-hegemonic movements assume their most comprehensive oppositional 
form on the extractive frontier of the global South, and in Latin America 
particularly, as rural and radical social movements of subaltern classes assert 
their right to reclaim both the land and the nation (Moyo and Yeros 2005, 2011). 
These social movements comprise the middle and lower peasants, semi-
proletarians, landless and indigenous peoples who, as explained earlier, have 
often lent their initial support to neo-developmentalist regimes, but who have 
become increasingly disillusioned with policies that have failed to address the 
structural causes of land poverty and market dependence, and have 
simultaneously despoiled, through extractivism, the foundations of their 
livelihoods.  
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In response, these constituencies increasingly advocate a model of post-capitalist 
socio-ecological relations that challenges market dependence, asserts the 
state/nation as the key focus of, and medium for, emancipation, centred around 
sustainable, non-fossil fuel based production. More than this, however, these 
constituencies, and particularly indigenous people, are destabilizing 
assumptions about state-ness, seeking, as they are, the redistribution and de-
concentration of power away from the state (Picq 2014) towards more devolved, 
communal and cooperative modes of living. Key and overlapping principles that 
guide this model are derived from agroecology (Altieri 1995), and food 
sovereignty (as summarized in the Nyeleni Declaration of 2007). 
  
The Nyeleni (Forum for Food Sovereignty) Declaration, while clearly anti-
systemic in intent, is at the same time deliberately broad and inclusive in scope, 
designed to codify and consolidate food sovereignty as a political project 
characterized by a widening constituency of support in both the global South and 
North (Alonso-Fradejas et al. 2015). The declaration is thus intended to be of 
sufficient discursive breadth to embrace both ‘progressives’ and ‘radicals’. This is 
the narrative ‘master frame’ described earlier. Despite such ‘dilution’ in the 
cause of political inclusivity, however, there remain within the Declaration 
strong assertions relating to land sovereignty and social equality that spring 
clearly from the class positionality of the ‘radical’ fraction of LVC.22 This, more 
radical, interpretation of food sovereignty, one arising from its initial anti-
imperialist impulse, builds, significantly for our argument, on the ‘return’ of the 
national question in the South in response to socio-ecological contradictions of 
neoliberalization (Moyo and Yeros 2011; Edelman 2014).  
 
Food sovereignty, as advocated by its global Southern advocates (see Holt-
Gimenez and Shattuck 2011), thus emphasizes social relational transformation 
towards national (perhaps post-national) and land (resource) sovereignty, with 
social equality. Similarly, it emphasizes the need for a supersession of market 
dependence and a problematization of the ‘state’, both as complicit in the new 
imperial project, but also as potential challenger to it. This approach appears to 
combine a normative ‘autonomism’ with a ‘dual powers’ strategy. The radical 
fraction thus seeks to transform the jurisdictional authority of the state by 
challenging the state system, as a class relational system, so as to enable the 
state, as a key nexus for emancipatory change, to define socially equitable and 
ecologically sustainable policies for agriculture and food (Moyo and Yeros 2011). 
This process captures the paradox of the state both as a constrainer and as a 
potential enabler of emancipatory change (McKeon 2015). This paradox is 
possible precisely because the state is not a ‘thing’ but itself a social relation 
internally related to the balance of class forces in ‘civil society’. In this way, food 
sovereignty challenges the institutional relations of the new imperialism that, 
                                                        
22 The following assertions seem most pertinent here: ‘[Food sovereignty] ensures that the rights 
to use and manage lands, territories, waters, seeds, livestock and biodiversity are in the hands of 
those of us who produce food. Food sovereignty implies new social relations [sic] free of 
oppression and inequality between men and women, peoples, racial groups, social and economic 
classes and generations.’ 
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embodied in the state and inter-state system, underlie primitive accumulation 
and market dependence.   
 
The state here, therefore, is seen to be an essential means to an end, not an end 
in itself, marking a clear disjuncture between ‘radical’ re-peasantization 
discourse and that of the ‘old’ left and neo-developmentalism. For the former, 
new social relations are founded on strong rural community development, 
embodying a re-unification of ‘community’23 members with the means of 
production, socialization of the means of production as a common pool resource 
(vested in the community under devolved democratic control), adoption of a 
circular economy, and satisfaction of human needs according to criteria of 
human well-being and ecological sustainability (Wong and Sit 2015). In this 
process, equality is both a prerequisite for, and the objective of, cooperation.  
Cooperation, strictly circumscribed within capitalism by the imperative of 
competition and the drive to generate surplus value, is here liberated in the 
service of use value production and its allocation according to need, not profit. 
Social equality combines with the ecological imperative of de-growth, yielding a 
political ecological programme of de-growth solidarity (Exner et al. 2013). This, 
in effect, constitutes an agrarian transition in reverse, in which the agrarian 
question is resolved in favour of the middle and lower peasantry, other subaltern 
groups, and the environment.   
 
Land sovereignty, in its turn, can realistically come about only through a process 
of reclaiming the nation (Moyo and Yeros 2011), in which new assertions of 
national sovereignty utilize the key jurisdictional authority of the state to 
transform class relations away from state centricity and ‘modern sovereignty’ to 
the benefit of the semi-proletarian, landless, and indigenous majority. As Amin 
suggests (2015, 30) ‘… a land tenure reform conceived from the perspective of 
the creation of a real, efficient and democratic alternative supported by 
prosperous peasant family production must define the role of the state (principal 
inalienable owner) and the institutions and mechanisms of administering access 
to land and the means of production.’ This social relational transformation, re-
asserting the political authority of community (commons) as solidarity, and 
subverting the institutional separation of the ‘economy’ and ‘polity’ of the 
capitalist state as the foundation of modern sovereignty, finally removes the 
market (capitalism) as essential mediator between people and their means of 
livelihood. 
 
As Herrera and Lau suggest:  
The guiding principle is community control over and management of land 
and water as commons…As La Via Campesina demands, the struggle is not 
just for ‘land’ (for individual households to operate in an atomized 
                                                        
23 Defined as a community of people living together and practicing common ownership, 
sometimes in reference to communal forms of organization that preceded the modern state, for 
example, the ayllu in the Andes. We should be wary, however, of de-historicizing and idealizing 
such ‘traditional’ and customary forms of social organization, these being frequently 
inegalitarian, patriarchal and embedded in wider systems of hierarchy such as the Incan state. As 
Amin (2015: 23) notes, ‘…there is no reason to heap excessive praise upon these traditional 
rights as a number of anti-imperialist, nationalist ideologies unfortunately do.’ 
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manner, vulnerable to the dictates of the market and financial capital), 
but also for ‘territory’, which involves cultural, social, and economic 
reorganization of communal relations to produce in a cooperative and 
collective manner. This necessitates that the ‘commons’ are not objects 
for appropriation or control still operating within the logic of capitalism, 
but focal nodes supporting a different relationship of community 
members amongst themselves and with nature. (Herrera and Lau 2015, 
156) 
 
This vision of land, territorial, perhaps livelihood, sovereignty appears to have 
strong links with Marx’s comments, albeit often fragmentary and programmatic, 
on possible communism in general, and on cooperation and mutual concern 
more specifically (see, for example, Ollman 2003). While some of his 
commentary on possible communism in relation to the development of the 
productive forces, for example, may appear anachronistic in the light of current 
and looming biophysical contradictions and constraints, the main thrust of his 
argument appears, nonetheless, entirely consistent with the ‘radical’ LVC 
positionality articulated above.  
 
Thus, a major characteristic of communist society as envisaged by Marx is the 
high degree of cooperation and mutual concern that is discernable in most 
human activities. One indication of this is simply the increase in the number of 
things that people undertake in common. Marx claims that: 
Communal activity and communal consumption – that is, activity and 
consumption which are manifested and directly confirmed in real 
association with other men – will occur wherever such a direct expression 
of sociality stems from the true character of the activity’s content and is 
adequate to the nature of consumption. (Marx 1972, 104) 
 
Of greater significance than the mere spread of cooperation, however, is the fact 
that it is envisaged to be qualitatively superior to what may be characterized as 
cooperative behaviour in pre-communist society. Marx believed, of course, that 
production is social in any society since it is always carried on through some 
relationship with other people. Cooperation in pre-communist society, however, 
is seen to be tenuous, unconscious and forced, characteristics of all class-based 
societies, including capitalism, in which cooperation is subordinated to the 
exploitative relations between the dominant propertied classes and those from 
whom surplus labour is extracted24. In communist society, however, cooperation 
becomes unconstrained, close, conscious and free, such that interdependence 
becomes the recognized means to transform the limitations defined by what was 
hitherto unrecognized and constrained interdependence (Ollman 2003).  
 
Because people are now, in communism, ‘brought into practical connection with 
the material and intellectual production of the whole world’ (Marx 2000, 196), 
interdependence and cooperation are worldwide and appreciated as such. 
                                                        
24 As we have seen, in capitalism cooperation is subordinated to the need to sell commodities at 
a profit, dependent on competitive relations between enterprises and labour, with surplus value 
extracted from the latter being contingent on its separation from the means of production and its 
alienation from cooperative association with others outside the confines of the workplace. 
 33 
Crucially, this represents the liberation of human capacities and production from 
the necessity under capitalism to produce commodities solely for the purpose of 
realizing the surplus value contained in exchange values. In communism, these 
capacities are directed to the production of use values for the satisfaction of 
human needs in conformity with those of extra-human nature. These relations, in 
communism, lead each individual to become conscious of humanity (and extra-
human nature) as part of him/herself as a ‘social being’. ‘Not until man has 
recognized his own capacities as social capacities…will human emancipation be 
achieved’ (Marx 1993, 600). In other words, it is not until people recognize that 
humans are social animals, with altruism and cooperative motivations being 
intrinsic facets of our species being, will our emancipation and the realization of 
our full capacities be attained. Perhaps nothing in communist society helps to 
explain the extraordinary cooperation that Marx envisages as characterizing this 
period as much as the individual’s new conception of self, which in turn could 
emerge fully only as a product of such cooperation. ‘The labour power of all the 
different individuals is consciously applied as the combined labour power of the 
community’ (Marx 1972, 78).  
 
The route to this fully cooperative and collective society of the commons, 
realizing the potentiality of humanity’s ‘species being’, is seen to be undertaken 
via the ‘first stage of communism’ in which the satisfaction of social needs (not 
profit) becomes the accepted goal of material production and social organization 
(Ollman 2003). In this process, the state, through the ‘dictatorship of the 
proletariat’25, is seen to have a key transitional role, one of the most important of 
which is the abolition of capitalist social property relations including abolition of 
property in land (see quote from Amin 2015 above). In this process, Marx seems 
to suggest the need for a strategic alliance between proletarians and peasants 
(middle and lower) and, indeed, suggests that the lower peasantry and the 
proletariat may be one and the same, constituting a natural alliance.  
The proletariat must take measures, as a government, through which the 
peasant finds his position directly improved, which thus wins him for the 
revolution; measures which facilitate in essence the transition from 
private property in land to collective property, so that the peasant himself 
is converted for economic reasons. But it must not antagonize the peasant 
by, for instance, proclaiming the abolition of the right of inheritance or 
the abolition of his property: this is only possible where the capitalist 
owner has ousted the peasant, and the real tiller of the soil is just as much 
a proletarian, a wage worker, as the urban worker, and hence has directly, 
and not only indirectly, the same interests as he. (Marx 2000, 606) 
 
This seems to suggest, in line with our own argument, that the upper peasantry 
(the capitalist owner, including the ‘progressives’) has a closer affinity with other 
fractions of the capitalist class than with the other levels of the peasantry. To 
what extent, however, is this proposed alliance between the proletariat and the 
                                                        
25 Marx did not use this concept to refer to the extra-legal and often violent rule by one 
individual or clique of individuals. Rather, his use is a reference to ancient Rome, where the 
constitution provided for the election of a dictator to carry out certain specified tasks for a 
limited period, generally in times of crisis. For Marx, the expression meant the democratic rule of 
the entire ‘working class’, including subaltern classes (Ollman 2003). 
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lower/middle peasantries, with the putative potential to overthrow capitalism 
(whether neoliberalism or neo-extractivism), apparent or emergent in the social 
movements today in the global South, and in Latin America specifically? We 
suggest some answers to this question by returning, albeit briefly, to our Bolivian 
case study. 
 
Under conditions of neo-extractivism and the ‘compensatory state’, the class 
struggle in Bolivia appears to have assumed two principle dimensions 
(Veltmeyer 2014). The first dimension relates to labour in the public sector and 
to the mass of proletarianized and semi-proletarianized rural and urban workers 
comprising, firstly, the huge urban proletariat of self-employed workers in the 
informal sector and, secondly, a rural proletariat of landless or near-landless 
workers. Labour in this sector makes up well over half the ‘economically active 
population’ and the mass of the urban poor. This dimension of struggle refers in 
the main to rural urban dynamics in the altiplano and yungas regions of Bolivia, 
largely outside the new extractive zones located primarily in the eastern 
lowlands of the country.  
 
The second dimension of class struggle, located largely in the eastern lowlands, 
relates, firstly, to the conditions generated by the operations of extractive capital, 
conditions that have given rise to conflict between the mining companies and the 
government, on the one hand, and the indigenous peoples and communities 
negatively affected by extractivism, on the other. It relates, secondly, to the 
mega-infrastructure projects proposed or undertaken by the MAS government 
and capital in support of extractivism. The class struggle here is one waged 
essentially by indigenous groups in defence of their territorial rights to the land, 
water and subsoil resources on which their social existence and well-being 
depend, and in protest against the destructive effects of mining operations on the 
environment and their livelihoods. The movements formed to this end have been 
increasingly active in recent years, as the foreign mining companies have 
intensified their operations with government support (Webber 2016).  
 
There are indications that these two dimensions of the class struggle are 
beginning to coalesce, with the confrontation between the government and 
social movements becoming increasingly dynamic and fractious. The proposal by 
the MAS government to construct a trans-continental highway through the 
Territorio Indigena y Parque Isiboro Secure (TIPNIS) in support of extractivism 
and against its own constitutional commitment to protect indigenous lands and 
nature has acted as a catalyst for the coalescence of these two dimensions of 
class struggle (Ormachea Saavedra 2011; Veltmeyer 2014).  
 
The approach to development taken by the Morales government, the 
‘compensatory state’ through ‘progressive’ extractivism, and the policy measures 
taken to redress the ‘inequality predicament’, raise serious questions about the 
likelihood, or even the possibility, of this regime consolidating and sustaining the 
few and limited gains made towards fulfilling its stated aim of creating a 
cooperative and communitarian society in which all Bolivians ‘live well’ in social 
solidarity and in harmony with mother nature. The government, like others in 
Latin America, has chosen to build the compensatory state on the proceeds of a 
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particularly regressive and destructive form of capital accumulation, in which 
the heavy social and environmental costs are borne disproportionately by the 
communities most directly affected by the operations of extractive capital 
(Veltmeyer and Petras 2014). 
 
This extractivist offensive has given rise to a destabilizing process of class 
struggle characterized by a veritable wave of protest and social resistance 
(Webber 2016). In the last few years, a large number of movements and 
struggles have been calling into question the extractivist-export model and its 
attendant violence and environmental devastation wrought primarily by 
transnational capital via the medium of the Morales regime. By means of the 
compensatory state, the Morales government has constructed a structure of 
legitimacy, or in other words ‘flanking’ measures, to support renewed capital 
accumulation through extractivism (Orellana 2011). This represents an attempt 
to embed capitalism through income and infrastructure measures for low-
income groups founded on a narrative of communalism and cooperation as vivir 
bien. In this way, the MAS government had, until recently, temporarily stabilized 
the contradiction between the accumulation and legitimation functions of the 
capitalist state, a manoeuvre on which Polanyi might have looked favourably. But 
because this development model failed to address the class and environmental 
contradictions of capitalism, it now appears to be unravelling, as elsewhere in 
Latin America. With the de-legitimation of extractivism, the proletariat, lower 
and middle peasants, and indigenous groups are increasingly advocating a model 
of the cooperative society beyond capitalism, a trend that Marx might have 
viewed as a vindication of his critique of political economy. 
  
It seems clear, then, that the capital-state nexus, whether neoliberal or neo-
developmental, is incapable of satisfying the demands generated by the ‘radical’, 
counter-hegemonic struggles of the middle and lower peasantries, indigenous 
groups, and the proletariat for cooperative futures beyond capitalism and liberal 
citizenship26. When Marx refers to the ‘illusions about freedom’ of bourgeois 
(liberal) democracy or ‘autonomy’, he is not suggesting that they are false but 
rather that their reality masks deeper forms of unfreedom. The ‘citizenship 
illusion’, as liberal autonomy, arises from the reified structure of capitalist social 
relations. It is an ‘objectified illusion’ that reveals and conceals simultaneously: it 
‘reveals’ certain limited rights and freedoms within the political sphere while 
concealing the class inequalities of the economic sphere. The latter entails, inter 
alia, the subordination of cooperation to the dictates of capitalist competition. 
This is something that Marx, but not Polanyi, identified. As a reified social form, 
                                                        
26 As Zibechi notes, enlarging the sphere of liberal ‘autonomy’ or citizenship (modern 
sovereignty) appears not to be one of the demands of these movements: Their de facto exclusion 
from citizenship seems to have prompted them to build a fundamentally different world. 
Understanding that the concept of citizenship has meaning only if some are excluded has been a 
painful lesson learned over the past decades. Hence, the movements tend to press beyond the 
concept of citizenship, which was useful for two centuries for those who need to contain and 
divide the dangerous classes (Zibechi 2012, 16). 
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liberal autonomy both constrains certain types of social action, such as 
cooperation, whilst enabling others, such as being ‘free’ to compete.  
 
As such, it is also tightly bound up with the distribution and exercise of social 
power: the structural separation of the economic and political spheres within the 
modern state was intended to constrain actions which might impinge on the 
economic powers of capital, such as ‘strong’ cooperation, while enabling purely 
political rights and obligations. And these constraints hold similarly for actions 
in the ‘more-than economic’ (as ‘society’ and ‘environment’), actions that can be 
undertaken only when consistent with private property rights and the profit 
imperative. This trichotomy, however, was only ever an imperfect solution to the 
deeper contradiction between politico-legal equality and environmental 
sustainability, on the one hand, and class inequality and exploitation, on the 
other. And even the conferral of such constrained, liberal and ‘ecological’ 
citizenship rights has been contingent on imperialism and the territorial form of 
the state, defining the included (the majority in the global North) and the 
excluded (the majority in the global South).  
 
That is why Marx insisted that the political emancipation embodied in abstract 
citizenship remains only a partial victory (and one rendered more partial still 
because of its reliance on the ‘spatio-temporal’ fix that is imperialism). This is 
why food sovereignty based in abstract rights and in the ‘embedded’ markets of 
the ‘progressives’ remains inadequate to the task of fulfilling its real mission of 
radical egalitarianism (Patel 2011). Human emancipation  - ‘actual’ autonomy - 
requires the reintegration of political power into society, where social 
organization is oriented to fulfilling human needs (and those of extra-human 
nature) rather than the demands of profit. This requires the liberation of 
cooperation by means of the dissolution of constraints imposed by market 
competition. It also entails the reintegration of ‘economy’, ‘society’ and 
‘environment’ referred to in the title of this paper. It is precisely because the 
‘illusions’ of liberal autonomy are less encompassing in the global South, due to 
the intimate relation between modern sovereignty and imperialism, that 
counter-hegemonic social forces are more likely here to achieve this human (and 
extra-human) emancipation. The suggestion here is that food and land 
sovereignty need to be an essential part of this emancipatory process, 
encapsulated in the more integral concept of ‘livelihood sovereignty’ – and that 
this process should be informed by a Marxian, rather than Polanyian, definition 
of the ‘great transformation’ towards cooperative futures that this must entail.  
 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
Marx, writing in Capital, and Polanyi in the Great Transformation, noted that the 
transition towards ‘market civilization’ (Gill 2014) in 18th century Britain was 
predicated on state action to foment changes in social structure (social relations) 
that enabled this original germination of competitive capitalism. Central to this 
transformation, they maintained, was the alienation of land and labour, such that 
these newly defined ‘factors of production’ could now be bought and sold at 
market determined prices instead of being allocated, through conscious political 
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authority, according to tradition, redistribution, or reciprocity.  This paper has 
argued that it is this element of generalized competition, premised on the 
alienation of land and labour, that exerts ‘ecological dominance’ over the forms 
of cooperative organization which are possible within capitalism and which arise 
in response to it. Similarly, capitalism exercises ecological dominance over 
cooperative activities in the ‘more-than-economic’ spheres and will continue to 
do so long as the impulse to competition in the ‘economy’ remains the principal 
societal driver. We have also suggested that it is this competitive impulse, and 
resistances to it, that gives rise to the forms of ‘variegated cooperation’ described 
earlier as ‘hegemonic’ (enhancing competition), sub-hegemonic (mitigating 
competition), alter-hegemonic (compromising competition), and counter-
hegemonic (resisting competition). We proposed that these forms of variegated 
cooperation ‘map onto’ identifiable class positionalities, the latter two (alter-
hegemonic – ‘progressive’, and counter-hegemonic – ‘radical’) being informed by, 
or consistent with, the thinking of Polanyi and Marx respectively.  
 
We have argued that, of the two thinkers, it is Marx who undertakes the more 
trenchant critique of capitalism and who, by the same token, identifies the 
essential prerequisites for a an imaginary of unconstrained cooperation as 
communism. Essential prerequisites here are the sundering of the capital-labour 
relation and the alienability of property that underlie the competitive impulse 
and the atomization of non-capitalist social collectivities. Since the alienation of 
land and labour thus constitutes the quintessence of capitalism, it is the re-
appropriation of land by the dispossessed, for the cooperative production of use 
values for society as a whole, that marks the key element in capital’s 
transcendence and as the basis for future sustainability. Here the transformation 
of class relational power through political action within and around the state – a 
‘dual powers’ strategy – will be key in expunging exploitative relations and 
laying the jurisdictional and material foundations for social equity, cooperative 
organization, and ecological sustainability.  
 
We have argued that Polanyi, by contrast, failed to identify the class relational 
basis of capitalism, leading him to suggest that its contradictions could be 
addressed through a generalized and spontaneous response as the ‘double 
movement’. This difference between Polanyi and Marx is of profound importance 
now as we seek, with renewed urgency, our own ‘great transformation’ towards 
post-capitalist socio-natural relations. Polanyi, In failing to differentiate 
resistances according to their class relational character, simultaneously 
underestimated the polylithic character of capitalism and its capacity to co-opt, 
through hegemony, selected resistances into its protean dynamic. The result of 
this process, in the decades following publication of the Great Transformation 
(1944), was the co-optation of socialist impulses by capital into what became the 
Keynesian compromise. This compromise proved unsustainable, precisely 
because of the profound incompatibility between the goals of social solidarity 
and cooperation, and those of capitalism. The result was neoliberalism, a 
strategic relational response (Jessop 2005) by certain class fractions to the 
political contradictions for capital of the Keynesian compact.  
The failure of the socialist emancipatory impulse serves today to underline the 
need for a strategic relational approach, in which social movements such as food 
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sovereignty might be well advised to undertake an effective analysis of the 
complex and contradictory social realities they seek to transform (Bernstein 
2010), rather than assuming a simplistic binary between the ‘corporate’ food 
regime and its ‘other’. Effective transformation of the state-capital nexus towards 
desired cooperative futures will not occur without such analysis, even if the 
goals of transformation are necessarily framed in more inclusive and ‘populist’ 
ways.  In this paper, we have suggested that the ‘radical’ fraction of the food 
sovereignty movement, and its calls for land sovereignty and 
cooperative/communal relations as ‘actual’ autonomy, appears currently to offer 
the greatest promise in this regard, precisely because it pinpoints the key socio-
ecological contradictions of capitalism and the means by which they may be 
overcome. 
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